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INTRODUCTION
This Article explains two related functions served by the standing in
public law. Standing has been subject to voluminous1 and sustained
criticism over the past forty years.2 Indeed, articles on standing routinely
1

Louis Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971) (describing literature as
“enormous”).
2
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390 (3rd ed. 2000),
[hereinafter, TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (“[T]he law of standing has for some time been
the one of most criticized aspects of constitutional law.”); ERVIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 (3rd ed. 2006) (observing that
standing is apparently “incoherent,” and “frequently attacked” in an “extensive” corpus of
scholarship). See also, Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612
(2004) [hereinafter, Staudt, Modeling] (noting “countless” analyses of standing). See, e.g.,
See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 88-103 (1991);
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221
(1998); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis,
1984 WISC. L. REV. 37; Abraham Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1982) (describing standing as “incoherent or inappropriate, or both”);
Jaffe; articles cited in notes 3-6.
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begin with a recitation of subject’s vast “comment, criticism, and doctrinal
confusion.”3 Scholars almost unanimously4 regard the doctrine as pointless
and incoherent at best,5 a veil for ideological manipulations at worst.6 Prof.
Tushnet summarized the more charitable view: standing law “serves no
useful purpose.”7 In the view that has “acquired the status of folk wisdom,”
standing decisions are simply “concealed judgments on the merits” made
without the benefit of a full factual record.8 Not surprisingly, many leading
scholars call for significantly liberalizing or even abolishing it.9 Academic
disillusionment with standing has accompanied, or encouraged, dwindling
enthusiasm on the Court, which has somewhat loosened standing
restrictions over the last several decades.10
Unlike almost all previous scholarship, this Article applies economic
3

See, e.g., Staudt, Modeling at 613-14.
See id. For some rare exceptions, see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983)
[hereinafter Scalia, Separation of Powers]; Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article
III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 30709 (1979) (arguing that standing promotes individual autonomy) [hereinafter Brilmayer,
“Case or Controversy”]; articles cited in n.33.
5
See Fletcher (“[S]tanding law . . . has long been criticized as incoherent.”).
6
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N. Carol. L. Rev. 1741, 1786
(1999):
Modern standing law is closer to a part of the political system than to a part of
the legal system. It is characterized by numerous malleable doctrines and
numerous inconsistent precedents. Judges regularly manipulate the doctrines and
rely on selective citation of precedents to further their own political preferences.
7
Mark V. Tushnet, The “Case Or Controversy” Controversy: The Sociology of Article
III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1705 (1980).
8
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies – And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 U. VA. L. REV. 632, 635 (2006).
9
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 216-17 (1993)
(arguing against standing limitations for constitutional challenge to government action);
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Citizen Suits] (“the very
notion of an ‘injury-in-fact is not merely a misinterpretation of . . . Article III but also a
large-scale conceptual mistake” equivalent to early twentieth-century substantive due
process); Fletcher, supra, at 223 (urging courts to “abandon” standing requirements);
David R. Dow, Standing and Rights, 36 Emory L. J. 1195 (1987); Gene Nichol, Jr.,
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 650 (1985);
Mark Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
663 (1977).
10
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 195
(1996); Jensen, et. al., at 209 (noting that “there is virtual unanimity” that the Supreme
Court liberalized standing doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s). See Pierce, at 1788-89
(arguing that Akins represent a major liberalization of standing doctrine); Cass Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 613, 645 (1999) (same).
4
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analysis to the standing doctrine to show that it can prevent inefficient
dispositions of constitutional entitlements. In a distinct but related point,
standing protects peoples’ ability to individually determine the best use of
their rights. Thus contrary to conventional wisdom, standing has significant,
autonomous, and public-regarding functions. The analysis presented here
also helps explain many of the mysteries of standing: Why should inchoate
injuries be less justiciable than tangible ones? Isn’t it paradoxical that
justiciability exists when a few people are harmed, but not when a great
many are harmed? Why should standing be a greater barrier when plaintiffs
allege violations of the structural constitution rather than individual rights
provisions, given that the restrictions of the former ultimately exist to
protect individuals?
The next few paragraphs will briefly sketch the functions of standing
elaborated in this Article. Then the limits, scope and structure of the Article
will be discussed.
In the ordinary course of events, constitutional rights can be waived or
bargained away by their individual bearers, in keeping with a broader legal
culture that values litigant autonomy and favors the alienability of causes of
action. The alienability of rights is crucial to their being put to their highestvalue use. For example, a newspaper editor has a First Amendment right to
be free of censorship. She is approached by Pentagon officials and told that
the publication of a certain story will hurt national security. The editor can
seek an injunction against prior restraint – or she can waive this right by
voluntarily spiking the story. She can do this for the publicly-minded
reasons like national security, or entirely selfish ones like good relations
with potential Pentagon sources. Normally, decisions about the optimal use
of rights are made separately and discretely by disparate individuals, and
alienating their entitlement is one of the potential uses.
Sometimes circumstances make individual rights effectively inalienable
– not as a result of any explicit policy choice, but simply because of the
transaction cost structure of the situation. This happens when a single
governmental action infringes on the rights of many people with conflicting
preferences about how and whether to use their rights. In this situation,
when one person seeks injunctive relief, his exercise of his rights effectively
determines the exercise of the individual rights of everyone in the affected
class. Massive social welfare losses can result in such circumstances. It is
impossible to negotiate an efficient solution with a single rights-holder
because anyone in a large and open class can be that single person. Thus
every individual rights-holder, in the absence of standing restrictions, would
have veto power over a government action that affects the rights of many,
making strategic holdout likely. Standing allows courts to bypass the
problems of high transaction costs and strategic behavior by attempting to
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replicate the outcome that would be reached in a low-transaction cost
environment – the outcome in the sense of whether the government action
proceeds or not.
This Article shows that standing has important purposes not revealed by
current understandings of the doctrine. But recognizing the economic and
rights-protecting functions of standing is crucial for an assessment of
proposals to liberalize the doctrine. Such suggestions must take into account
the potentially large social welfare costs and individual-rights interference
that would exist in the absence of standing restrictions. Moreover, the
economic approach to standing helps define clearly the situations in which
standing problems arise. This may promote a more coherent application of
the doctrine, as well as providing a basis for functional criticism of its
misapplication.
This only amounts to an explanation, rather than endorsement of
standing doctrine. While standing solves real social problems, it is not a
costless solution. The costs include the delay or preclusion of judicial
review of illegal government activity and the foregone production of
precedent. Whether these costs exceed the benefits are questions separate
and subsequent to understanding the problems to which standing responds.
While this Article shows that standing may serve useful purposes, the
doctrine’s legitimate functions do not rule out illegitimate ones. Like any
other doctrine requiring judgment and discretion, standing can be
incorrectly applied or purposefully abused. This Article does not claim to
explain the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, which is largely but
not entirely consistent with the functional account presented here. At the
same time, the fact that standing serves the functions described here does
not mean it does not have any other potentially beneficial functions.11
This Article confines its analysis to the central component of the Art. III
standing doctrine – the requirement of a justiciable injury, also known as an
“injury-in-fact.” The role of standing described here is performed solely
through the injury component (which is also the most controversial).
Furthermore, it focuses on standing to assert constitutional rather than
statutory rights, which both courts and scholars suggest involve somewhat
different considerations. While much of the analysis applies equally to
11

For example, Maxwell Stearns has made an important contribution to the literature
by showing that standing prevents the manipulation of intransitive preferences on the Court
by strategic litigants. See Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability
and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 n. 58 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing
Back]; Maxwell Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PENN.
L. REV. 309, 309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Historical Evidence].
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congressionally-created rights, there are important normative differences
which will be explored briefly.12
A major criticism of standing doctrine is that there is no intelligible role
for the doctrine beyond determining whether substantive law gives the
plaintiff a cause of action.13 In this view, treating the doctrine as
jurisdictional obscures the real issue, which is simply about the scope of
rights protected by the substantive law. When a plaintiff does not have a
legally protected right at stake, standing gets the right result through the
wrong reasoning. When substantive law does give the plaintiff a legally
protected right and it is violated, refusing to recognize standing because the
right is broadly held or inchoate is simply a refusal to give effect to the
governing law. In this view, if the substantive law gives the plaintiff the
right to sue, that is the end of the matter.
This Article agrees with the critics that standing should not be used as a
proxy for the existence of a legally protected right. It parts company from
them in identifying a separate, autonomous and socially valuable function
for the doctrine. This function can only be seen precisely in those cases
where the individual plaintiff has a judicially-protected entitlement. Thus
throughout the Article, it will be assumed that all plaintiffs and potential
plaintiffs have a cause of action. Holding constant the cause of action issue
is necessary to isolating the independent function of the standing doctrine.
It will be further assumed that all plaintiffs have meritorious claims -that the challenged government conduct violates their rights. This further
removes any confusion between standing and merits questions by taking
plaintiffs’ claims as true. Because standing determinations are made at the
pleading stage, courts must construe the substantive claims as favorably to
the plaintiff as possible. Again, standing’s independent role can only be
seen when one holds constant other elements of the case.
Any particular standing regime can fall on a spectrum from restrictive,
where potentially no one can challenge certain wrongs, to permissive,
where almost anyone can sue. For ease of exposition, this Article will use
terms like narrow or restrictive standing to refer to the former conception,
and liberal or broad standing to refer to the latter version. The most liberal
approach to standing rules can also be described as simply a lack of
standing barriers. Thus when this Article speaks simply of standing, it refers
the robust, restrictive vision of the doctrine.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sketches the standing
doctrine and particularly the injury requirement. It discusses efforts to
12

See Part V.D.
See Stearns, Standing Back at n.58 (observing that the cause-of-action theory is
dominant among scholars). See, e.g., sources cited at note 32, infra.
13
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understand the purpose of standing restrictions, and the major criticisms of
the existing rationales. The two major functions of standing are presented in
Parts II and III respectively. Part II sets out the transaction-cost function of
standing and it shows how it is entirely different from the dominant
accounts of the doctrine.
The economic approach may neglect the broader social purposes of
rights by focusing solely on their transactional value. Moreover, some
would contend that speaking of rights in welfarist terms is nonsensical, as
rights cannot be reduced to instrumental arithmetic. These objections are
taken up from Part II.E through Part III. Part III also presents the second,
non-economic function that standing plays – protecting individual
autonomy over the exercise of their rights, an autonomy that is threatened
when rights overlap.
Part IV considers whether the function of standing can be better served
through other means. It concludes that while various expedients would
solve some of the problems to which standing responds, none would solve
all of them, and the solutions would themselves have significant drawbacks.
All of this may explain why courts in fact use the standing doctrine. Part V
ties up some loose ends, such as why these functions of standing will never
be implicated in Equal Protection challenges, and the applicability of the
analysis to standing under congressionally-created rights.
I. THE DOCTRINE AND THE CRITICS
A. Constitutional basis.
Article III of the Constitution enumerates the three types of “Cases”
and six types of “Controversies” that fall within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.14 Not only must suits fall within one of the nine categories to
be heard by Art. III courts, they must also be presented in the proper
package – a case or controversy.15 On one level, this seems natural. Courts
resolve cases, not philosophical disputes, beauty contests, or broad
questions of foreign policy.16 The “case” is to the courts what the “bill” is to
Congress – the basic unit of operation. However, specifying the outer
bounds of a “case or controversy” proves exceedingly difficult.
14

U.S. CONST., ART. III. § 2.
The extent to which standing and related rules truly stem from the express or
implicit command of Article III has been a subject of some debate. Compare Sunstein,
Citizen Suits, 91 MICH. L. REV. at 169 (arguing standing is a 20th century invention with
value-laden goals), with Caleb Nelson & Anne Woolhander, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (defending historical basis of standing).
16
See Letter of John Jay to Alexander Hamilton, reprinted in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
DANIEL MELTZER, AND DAVID L. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 79-81 (5th ed. 2004).
15
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The various Article III justiciability doctrines – standing, ripeness,
mootness, political question, advisory opinions – all try to define the
contours of the case-or-controversy limitation. Standing, the “most
important of these doctrines,”17 focuses on whether a plaintiff is the right
person to bring a given issue before the court. This is what makes standing
jurisdictional – the inquiry is not about the existence of a wrong, but
whether the court can respond at the request of this plaintiff.
The Court has framed the standing inquiry as having three components:
whether the plaintiff alleges a “injury in fact,” whether that alleged injury
can “fairly be traced to the challenged action,” and finally, whether a
favorable ruling would probably end the injury.18 (Beyond this
constitutional “core” of standing, there are also “prudential” standing rules
invented by the courts themselves; Congress can presumably override these
“self-imposed restraints.”19 This Article analyzes only the Art. III
limitations on standing.)
B. Defining an Injury.
The standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff has a justiciable
injury, or an “injury-in-fact.” The Court itself has admitted that the concept
is “not susceptible of precise definition.”20 and most commentators amplify
that view. 21 Still, some basic concerns can be teased out. One concern is the
avoidance of “abstract” injuries. Standing demands that courts respond only
to “distinct and palpable” harms. This limitation most often has bite in
ideological litigation by public interest groups, or when the alleged conduct
causes inchoate harms, such as stigma. Related to abstractness is a concern
about “general” rather than “particular” injuries. When government action
harms many a great many people in the same way, none will have standing
to assert the “undifferentiated” injury. In such cases, the Court will say that
redress for the constitutional violation can only be had through the political
branches – a position man see as an abdication of judicial review.
None of these attempts to define standing have been convincing, even to
17

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
19
See Allen v. Wright. The main prudential rule prevents litigants from asserting the
rights of others (jus tertii). See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20
Allen v. Wright.
21
A quarter-century ago, it was already “customary in writing on standing to war the
reader” of its amorphous character. Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict
in the Federal Courts, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 723 n.1 (1979), citing Paul Freund, Hearings
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1966), pt.
2, pg. 498 (describing standing as “among the most amorphous” doctrines “in the entire
domain of public law”).
18
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the Court.22 The abstractness argument is used to rebuff groups with a
programmatic or ideological interest in the constitutional violation. It is true
that their sense of injury is a “psychological consequences . . . produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”23 But if the conduct also
violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights – the merits question – it is hard
to see why psychological injury in insufficient. Certainly psychological
harms are treated as concrete and justiciable in many ordinary tort contexts,
such as negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Indeed, if
everyone’s rights are violated, and only some are offended (due to differing
ideological views), this seems no different from an “egg-shell skull”
situation, where a particular precondition of the plaintiff (such as a concern
for the environment) makes him more prone to suffer severe harm from an
otherwise de minimus injury.
Denying standing because the injury is too “general” or
“undifferentiated” begs the question. Usually when a single course of
governmental conduct violates the rights of many people, all can sue.24 This
is true even if each person’s injury is identical, as is the case with most
large-scale instances of racial discrimination. Yet the Court has gone so far
as to suggest that when a constitutional violation violates the rights of all
citizens, none have standing.25
C. Purposes and criticisms.
Two related purposes are commonly adduced for the standing doctrine.
Standing is often said to tracks the purposes of the rule against advisory
opinions – to ensure a concrete, adversary presentation of the issues.26 The
“abstract” injury shunned by standing doctrine may lead to an “abstract”
presentation of the issues involved, while courts do best at incremental,
fact-specific determinations. And a plaintiff without a true Article III
“injury-in-fact” may not have enough on the line to invest the right amount
of resources in the case and fully inform the court of the consequences of an
adverse ruling.
22

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475.
Valley Forge at 485.
24
See JAMES P. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 34 (2006), (observing
that wrongful conduct often inflicts cognizable injuries on large classes of people); DAVID
P. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 26 (4th ed. 1999) (“It hardly seems an
appropriate reason for denying relief. . . that the Government has harmed many citizens
rather than only a few.”)
25
See Reservists Committee at 227.
26
See generally, Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class
Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory
Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006) (arguing that Art. III case or controversy
requirement demands genuine adversity between parties).
23
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Few find these justifications convincing. In particular, scholars argue
that the concept of “injury-in-fact” does not capture the degree of
concreteness or adversity in litigation.27 The injury requirement mostly bars
ideological or “public interest” plaintiffs. However, these are often
represented by well-financed, skilled and committed organizations.
Ideological plaintiffs may in fact care much more than anyone else about
the question.28 Nor does it appear that the attorneys for such plaintiffs fail to
raise relevant considerations sharply enough.29 Which is just another way of
saying ideological injuries are real rather than abstract, and indeed, any
injuries that prompt the plaintiff to invest in litigation are real (especially
given that the relief sought is often purely injunctive).30 As Judge Fletcher
famously wrote, to say that a plaintiff who feels injured does not have a
cognizable injury is to call him a liar. Surely courts should not address an
issue sua sponte, but the initiation of an action by a private party who is
sincerely aggrieved should be enough to remove the non-adversity/advisory
opinion concerns.
More recently, the Court has begun to argue that standing supports the
separation of powers, in particular between the judiciary and the executive.
The latter is charged with ensuring the laws are “faithfully executed” by the
government. Given limited resources, this necessarily entails some degree
of discretion. If anyone can challenge the legality of government action, it
may curtail or interfere with the President’s “Take Care” power.31 This
argument is much stronger in the context of congressionally-conferred
standing, which might be a legislative end-run around executive
management and enforcement of statutes. The Court also says standing
27

See Fletcher at 247048; Amar, supra note __, at 719 n. 154 (arguing that “any
legitimate interest in guaranteeing adverse presentation of issues can easily be handled”
without the standing doctrine).
28
See Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending – The Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2001) (“[I]deological plaintiffs . . . will address
the issues of principle raised in litigation precisely because they care as much about the
structure of American government independent of the impact of their own pocketbooks.”);
Landes & Posner at __.
29
See Epstein at 46; Loius L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PENN. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (1968):
[Investing money in a lawsuit from which one is to acquire no further monetary
profit argues . . a quite exceptional kind of interest . . . From this I would
conclude that, insofar as the argument for a traditional plaintiff runs in terms of
the need for effective advocacy, the argument is not persuasive.
30
See Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court -- A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645, 674 (1973) (“If plaintiff did not have the minimal personal
involvement and adverseness which Article III requires, he would not be engaging in the
costly pursuit of litigation.”).
31
See Scalia.
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protects the separation of powers in a broader sense, by preventing judges
from sitting as a Council or Revision. But this is simply a restatement of the
advisory opinion concern.
Given the doctrinal incoherence, it is not surprising the entire Art. III
standing inquiry has been assailed by commentators. The purpose of this
Article is not to rebut any of the criticism of standing, but rather to explain
its function and show some negative consequences of its abandonment.
Thus only the main thrusts of the criticism will be sketched here. The
criticisms of standing will be shown as orthogonal to at least one of the
doctrine’s important functions.
The classic and persistent criticism is that the only proper “standing”
inquiry is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.32 If some source of law
allows him to sue in response to certain conduct, he has all the “injury”
required. In this view, standing is at best a misnamed inquiry into whether
the relevant law gives the plaintiff an entitlement against the kind of harm
he alleges. At worst, standing is a way of delegitimizing or raising barriers
to certain kinds of injuries disfavored by the courts.
Moreover, the jurisdictional status of standing, combined with the
unpredictability of the doctrine, makes it susceptible to political
manipulation. Since it is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, justices
can raise doubts about standing sue sponte. And due to the amorphous and
shifting nature of “injury-in-fact,” courts can use it as a cover for rejecting
cases on grounds of politics, ideology, or personal convenience.
D. Economic analyses.
Only a few scholars have examined standing from an economic
perspective.33 One of these, a brief and unnoticed paper by Jensen, et. al.,

32

See Fallon, Remedies, 92 U. VA. L. REV. at 664-65 (arguing that Court’s treatment
of injury-in-fact cases are actually about the “substantive merits of the plaintiffs’
underlying claims”); Sunstein, Citizen Suits, 91 MICH. L. REV. at 166 n.15; Amar at 719
n.154 (“A properly framed case in which a plaintiff has ‘standing’ is simply one in which
she has a cause of action.”); Currie, Misunderstanding; Fletcher, Structure; Sunstein,
Privatization; Fletcher at 223 n.18 cites numerous additional commentators to this affect.
33
See Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling, & Clifford G. Holderness, Analysis of
Alternate Standing Doctrines, 6 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 205 (1986); Clifford G.
Holderness, Standing, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 505
(1998); Stearns, Standing Back, supra note _ (showing that given a likelihood of
intransitive preferences among justices, standing limits litigants’ ability to manipulate
outcomes through strategic litigation ); Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra (elaborating the
social choice theory of standing); Khanna, supra note __, Functional Understanding
(arguing that standing acts as screen for socially undesirable litigation); Scott, supra note
__, at 669-678. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Towards a Functional Analysis of Standing
3, work-in-progress (2002), [hereinafter Functional Analysis] available at
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anticipates some of the analysis of this Article by observing that broad
standing makes entitlements inalienable and thus generates inefficiencies.34
The Jensen paper did not deal with standing to assert constitutional or
public rights. Rather, it focused on the classic law and economics context of
private nuisance litigation, and acknowledged that extending the analysis to
public law involves additional complications.35
This Article expands significantly on the earlier discussion, and applies
it to new areas. Unlike the Jensen paper, this Article identifies significant
additional transaction costs arising from strategic behavior, and examines
the role of different remedial regimes. Furthermore, it broadens the analysis
to include different conceptions of rights. Jensen, et. al. compare only two
alternate regimes: strict and liberal standing. This Article considers several
additional alternative regimes (such as switching to liability rules) that
might perform better than either polar solution.
II. STANDING AND EFFICIENCY
This Part shows how broad standing to challenge certain types of
government action could result in inefficient outcomes because of high
http://ssrn.com/abstract=304390 (discussing paucity of “functional analysis” of standing
law).
A very brief discussion of prudential standing rules can also be found in William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEG.
STUD. 683, 718-19 (1994) (discussing economic rationales for barring jus tertii suits, and
noting that allowing third parties to have standing makes it difficult to “allocate property
rights in legal claims”). The present Article does not deal with the prudential limitation of
jus tertii. However, it shows that under certain circumstances particularly likely to arise in
constitutional litigation, it becomes difficult to allocate property rights in legal claims even
when standing is given only to the primary victims. In other words, all hard standing cases
are in a sense jus tertii cases.
Political scientists have also devoted little attention to the doctrine. For some rare
exceptions, see Staudt, Modeling, supra (presenting statistical analysis demonstrating that
when underlying law is unclear, judges use standing doctrine to advance persona policy
preferences); C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffrey Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who
Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the Federal District Courts, 53 J.
POL. 175 (1991); Gregory J. Rathjen & Harold J. Spaeth, Access to the Federal Courts: An
Analysis of Burger Court Policy Making, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360 (1979).
34
Jensen et. al. at 10-11. Only six citations can be found on Westlaw and JSTOR; most
of these are only in passing.
35
See id. at 206-07 (discussing implications of different standing rules in context of
private nuisance suits). Jensen et. al. only mention suits against the government in a single
paragraph, and do not differentiate between constitutional and statutory claims. Id. at 212.
They correctly note that their central point carries over from private law to public, but did
not build on this. See also, Scott, supra at 646 (arguing that economic analysis of standing
must distinguish suits against government officials from litigation between private parties
because the “important considerations . . . overlap to a degree but are far from identical”).
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transaction costs and the possibility of strategic behavior.36 Standing
doctrine can be understood as a way of avoiding the potentially large social
costs that would result from a liberal standing regime, though this solution
is itself not costless.
Standing doctrine has long been unable to formulate coherent rules for
principled identification of cases where it should apply. Understanding the
problem standing responds to allows one to distinguish situations that pose
genuine standing problems from those that do not. A basic definition will be
presented in section B, and then further refinements to narrow the scope of
the standing inquiry will be discussed. This Part will also show how the
definition of standing developed here differs from the dominant account.

A. Structure of constitutional transactions
1. Differing valuations.
In the constitutional system, most entitlements are broadly, even
universally, held. The entitlements are generally negative, giving the holder
a right to be free of certain kinds of government action. However, different
individuals attach different values to them, either in all circumstances or in
some circumstances. There can even be differences in the sign of the values
across entitlement holders. The value of an entitlement to a person is always
the difference between:
W, the welfare derived from the government action that the right
entitles one to be free of and C, the cost of challenging it in court (assume to
be a negative number).
A person will be better of waiving their right when W > C, where C
is never positive. To start with the conventional case, if the government
action results in a welfare loss for the entitlement holders such that W = $100, he will exercise his right at any C to up to -$100. This person would
bargain away the entitlement for any amount greater than $90 (the net
benefit of enforcement). A second case deserves attention. The same
government action may have positive welfare effects for a second
entitlement holder, such that W = $100. She will exercise her right to block
it at the cost of $10 only if paid at least $110 to do so.
The first person will be better of exercising his right at certain levels of
C, while the second person will never be better of exercising her right,
regardless of C. The first person would demand payment to waive their
right; the second person, on the other hand, would demand payment to
exercise it. In the example above, if bargaining were possible, the second
36

“Inefficiency” is used here in the Caldor-Hicks sense to refer to the blocking of an
action whose social benefits exceed its costs.
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person would pay the first anywhere between $90 and $100 to waive his
entitlement, which is efficient. All of this is a result of the welfare effect of
the government action on the first person being negative and for the second
person being positive. This Article shall refer to these two cases as negative
value and positive value entitlement holders, referring to their respective
valuation of the government action that they have a legal right to be free of.
The notion of positive value entitlement holders may at first seem
counterintuitive, so a few additional words should be said in this regard. It
is important to distinguish legal injury from harm. The former refers to the
violation of protected entitlements, the latter to value or cost of the
violation. The same legal injury can cause harm or benefit depending on the
person’s subjective disposition. The difference between assault and
affection lies largely in how the recipient feels about them. In tort law, the
difference between injury and harm is subsumed by the substantive law: a
consensual touch is not a permissible assault, but simply no violation at all.
The situation is less clear in constitutional law. With a police search,
advance consent makes it “reasonable,” and thus not a violation of the
underlying entitlement. But not all situations are like this. Ex ante consent is
only practical on an individual level. Broad violations of the kind that give
rise to standing questions are not, perhaps can not, be consented to in
advance. So at least on a technical level the injury has occurred, and the
question turns to redressability, remedy, and harm -- which may vary
greatly among the affected group.
As Prof. Scott has written, in a view typical of standing critics, “Once
the reality of non-monetary injuries is accepted, it follows that an individual
who attaches more weight to some personal value than do most does suffer
a differential injury from its transgression.”37 But it also follows that
individuals can attach different values to such injuries, and these may be
positive or negative. This has important implications. If members of the
injured class all have non-positive values, and the principal relief sought is
injunctive (as will generally be the case in this kind of constitutional
litigation), than a plaintiff with a greater negative value may be a fine
representative of all others. If values can be either positive or negative, the
ideological plaintiff’s interests may be opposed to those in the class of
entitlement-holders the disposition of whose entitlements he is in effect
determining.
2. Highest-value use.
From a social perspective, the highest value use of the entitlement –
exercise or waiver – depends on the proportion of positive and negative
37

See Scott at 691-92.
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value entitlement holders, and the actual values they assign. If the aggregate
positive value exceeds the aggregate negative value, the socially optimal
use of the entitlement is waiver. Usually none of these matters rise to the
surface because in most government action, each individual can choose
between exercise and waiver in a way that does not affect or limit the
choices of others. However, when a single government action infringes on
many entitlements at once, and injunctive remedies are available, only one
choice can be made.
In these circumstances, a positive value plaintiff’s valuation may not
accord with the highest-value use of the entitlement. All would benefit if he
could be compensated by the others, who attach a greater value to a
different use of the entitlement, in exchange for waiving his right (which in
this context would consist of consenting to rather than challenging the
governmental action). However, liberal standing rules create transaction
cost and hold out problems that make such Pareto optimal arrangements
impossible. By giving many individuals the power to veto a government
action that implicates the rights of many or all, broad standing makes
constitutional rights inalienable de facto though they remain alienable de
jure. As in any other context, the inalienability of a resource prevents it
from being put to its highest value use.
For entitlements to be put to their highest value use, they must be
alienable to some degree. This is because the law does not always know
what the highest value use is in the wide variety of circumstances that might
arise. The original entitlement holder’s use may be the highest value one in
the most common circumstances or under the circumstances that obtain
when the entitlement is allocated -- but it may not be optimal in all
circumstances. The debate about the relative merits of property, liability and
inalienability rules is largely about how alienable entitlements must be for
them to be put to their highest-valued use.38 Inalienability is only desirable
when there is a high degree of confidence that the original distribution of
entitlements is optimal under all circumstances. This is rarely the case, and
thus most entitlements are alienable to a significant degree. This is just as
true of constitutional entitlements as private law ones. Sometimes
circumstances make resources that are legally alienable de facto inalienable.
High transaction costs are a common source of alienability limitations, and
lowering them is universally regarded as a good role for law.

38

Compared to property rules, liability rules promote relatively easier transfer of
entitlements, and thus on this score may promote efficient allocations; on the other hand,
there is a greater chance that the transfer price under a liability rule would not be accurate,
thus encouraging either too much or too little transfer.
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B. Defining the Problem
1. Jointness.
Liberal standing doctrine can result in socially inefficient outcomes by
making rights effectively inalienable when i) a single government program
or course of conduct ii) infringes on a large number of people’s
constitutional entitlements (the entitlement violated is the same for all
people), and iii) and the affected group includes people with both negative
and positive valuations of the right in question iii) and the program by its
nature cannot be tailored to affect only non-objecting entitlement holders –
opt-out is impractical. The inability to disaggregate governmental conduct
that affects many at once will be called the “jointness problem.” In such
cases, one person’s exercise of their entitlement necessarily implicates the
entitlements of everyone else affected by the action. This will be called a
situation of “overlapping rights.” The likelihood of fatal barriers to
bargaining, and thus inalienability, increases the larger the class of potential
plaintiffs, the looser its definition, and the more open its membership.
Furthermore, the larger the size of the class, the greater the likelihood for
holdout by low-value entitlement holders, free rider problems among the
high-value entitlement holders.
2. Inaugural example.
The efficiency implications of broad standing can be best explained
with an example, taken from a little-noted recent case that would have
commanded national attention were it not dismissed for lack of standing.
Everyone has a individual right under the First Amendment to be free of an
establishment of religion. The right is personal: establishment does not
violate the constitution in some sterile sense, but rather infringes on the
seperate anti-establishment entitlements of a great number of people.39
A few months before a presidential inauguration, it becomes clear that
the event will involve public prayers delivered by sectarian clergy. Learning
of this, a committed atheist sues in federal court to enjoin the imminent
violation of his entitlement against religious Establishment.40 Unlike the
39

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer standing to challenge
government spending on establishment grounds). Indeed, challenges to Ten
Commandments displays on public land proceed without the courts making a peep about
standing. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125
S.Ct. 2854 (2005). At the same time, there is no taxpayer or citizen standing to challenge
in-kind subsidies of religious institutions, suggesting at least some tension or confusion in
the Establishment Clause standing doctrine. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
40
Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp.2d 265, 268 (D. D.C. 2005) (describing the plaintiff
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plaintiff, most people are not bothered by such an inauguration, even though
they also have a right to be free of it (call them the Indifferent). A second
group prefers to have such an inauguration, for the sake of tradition,
national unity, or any other reason. Call them the “Inaugurationists.” The
plaintiff belongs to a third, much smaller portion of the population (the
“Dissenters”) that feels aggrieved by the pending inauguration. The
Inaugurationists and Dissenters correspond respectively to the positive and
negative valuation entitlement-holders discussed above.
Let the Indifferent make up 30 people out of a hypothetical population
of 100. Their welfare will not be affected one way or the other by the
inauguration or lack thereof. The second group consists of 69 people, who
would each get $100 benefit from the inauguration. Their right to be free of
this establishment has a negative value: for the sake of having the
inauguration, they would give up their entitlement to be free of it and pay
$100. (Entitlements can become liabilities, like a property interest in a
junked car.) Finally, the third group consists of just one person, who would
experience a $1000 loss from the ceremony. Finally, there is in objective
external indicator of what group one belongs to. Group membership is open,
since it depends entirely on subjective valuations. One can become religious
or loose religion; one could acquire or loose an interest in inaugurations;
one can become disgusted or indifferent to religious overtones at public
events. A crucial consequence is that no one knows the size of their own or
any other group.
The socially optimal outcome is for the inauguration to proceed. The
inauguration would produce $6900 worth of social value and $1000 of
social cost. And so long as the entitlements are alienable, the socially
optimal outcome will triumph; the sixty-nine Inaugurationists could settle
with the one Dissenter so that he would not pursue his Establishment Clause
claim. Any settlement between $1000 and $6900 would leave everyone
better off.
A liberal standing regime would prevent such efficiency gains from
being realized. While the original dissenter has an entitlement that would
allow him to block the inauguration, so does everyone else. As a result, the
Inaugurationists gain nothing from settling with the first dissenter, because
as far as they know, someone else could come along and bring the same
claim, necessitating the same settlement. Assume all settlements are for
$1100. In the absence of the problem caused by standing, the
Inaugurationists would be willing to settle with up to six people. But unless
challenging 2005 inauguration as a “well-known atheist litigant”). Newdow also brought a
similar suit against the 2001 inauguration, where standing was also denied. Id. at 268-89. In
the second case, he has obtained a ticket to the inauguration, whereas in 2001 he had said
he would watch it on television.
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they know that there are no more than six dissenters, it does not make sense
for them to settle with even one. Thus in the example with only one
dissenter, there will be no settlement, despite its efficiency.
Moreover, because of the way class membership is defined, it is
impossible to know the number of dissenters because this number is likely
to change. Assume that now that there initially six dissenters. They all settle
their claims for $1100. However, if they did so, a seventh person could
become a dissenter and bring the same claim. This is because the
characteristic that creates the class – objection to the inauguration – does
not create a closed class. This discussion does not assume insincere
behavior: rather, someone can actually change their valuation of the
entitlement. The problem becomes much more severe if one introduces
insincere behavior; indeed, it becomes more severe simply if the
Inaugurationists expect insincere behavior.
Returning to the example, if a subsequent seventh dissenter were paid
off, settlement costs would exceed the social value of the inauguration; if he
is not, he could enjoin the inauguration, making the $6600 in payments to
the first six dissenters pure waste. The outcome either way is inefficient,
and so the Inaugurationists would not bother settling with anyone in the first
place. Thus each individual’s right is in effect inalienable. This benefits no
one, not even the dissenters. Were standing narrower the dissenter would be
able to trade his right for something worth more to him.
To summarize, several features of broad standing raise transaction costs
to the point of inalienability. Since everyone has constitutional entitlements,
the absolute number of individuals involved can make bargaining difficult.
But this cannot be the defining feature of standing – a large number of
plaintiffs is not generally seen as a jurisdictional bar, especially in an era of
nation-wide class actions. Perhaps more importantly, liberal standing rules
make bargaining difficult because buyers (high value entitlement holders)
cannot identify sellers – the difference between the two turns on
unobservable characteristics such as ideology or sensibility or other matters
of preference. This also leaves the seller class open. The openness
combined with the ability of any one person to veto the entire transaction
threatens to make negotiation with any identified class member pointless.
3. Holdout.
Even if the dissenting class were small, identifiable and closed, the
strategic behavior could foil socially valuable action because any one
entitlement holder exercises veto power over a government program that
involves the entitlements of many. The situation resembles one where the
government needs to purchase ten adjacent lots to expand an airport
runway. Each transaction is legally distinct; each property owner can only
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transfer his individual parcel. However, to realize its goal, the government
must purchase all the lots; it does not get 90% of the benefit if it buys nine
houses but not the one in the middle; rather, until is secures 100% of the
rights, it gets none of the benefit.
While each individual only owns his own parcel, the structure of the
situation gives him the bargaining power that an owner of all the parcels
would have. Because the realization of the social surplus depends on the
consent of each owner, each owner can hold out for a disproportionately
high share of surplus – in this example, more than one tenth. In effect, the
combined parcels have ten different owners. This kind of strategic behavior,
known as holdout, makes transactional breakdown likely.41 Satisfying the
demands of all of the owners would wipe out the social surplus. Of course,
a complete failure of the transaction is a lost opportunity for the owners.
They might try to organize themselves to present a coordinated settlement.
Here the will face all the difficulties of cartelization. Even assuming they
can do this, there will always be an incentive for one of the owners at the
last minute to demand a slightly greater amount from the government.
Entitlement holders in these situations are likely to be geographically
isolated, with few or no prior interactions, united only by their common
valuation of the entitlement (that is, by valuing the affirmative exercise of
the entitlement more highly than its waiver). It would be difficult for such a
group, lacking any means of coercion over its members, to organize itself
and prevent last minute cheating.
Thus broad standing presents the holdout problem on a massive scale.
The more open the standing doctrine, the greater the number of de facto
“co-owners” of the entitlement. As the number of co-owners increases, so
does the likelihood of holdout. Moreover, the possibility of co-ordination
decreases. In the inauguration example, when the potential plaintiffs include
everyone in the country, holdout seems guaranteed.
4. Other problems.
Thus far it has been assumed that the only obstacle to the
Inaugurationists dividing a social surplus with potential objectors is that the
diffuse and uncertain distribution of entitlements makes them inalienable.
Holdout problems prevent potential objectors from organizing themselves
to surmount this difficulty. But broad standing makes it difficult for both
sides to organize. While the negative-valuation people face holdout
problems, the positive-valuation ones would face free-riders problems in
organizing themselves to pay compensation. The same thing that makes it
41

See Calabresi & Melamed; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The
Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1078
(1980).
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difficult for the Inaugurationists to know who the dissenters are will make it
hard for them to identify who members of their own group are; certainly
some will claim to be dissenters or Agnostics when the contribution hat is
passed. In short, broad standing raises transaction costs in a way that can
make otherwise attractive arrangements practically impossible.
If the number of positive-valuation entitlement-holders were high
enough, one can imagine the government acting as an agent for them. This
would be convenient since in a constitutional case, the government will be
the defendant and thus its interests coincide with those of the positivevaluation group. This is an imperfect solution, of course. Its willingness to
pay is an imperfect measure of the value of the entitlement. The government
may settle even when it is inefficient – that is, it may offer a settlement that
exceeds the surplus of the Inaugurationists simply to avoid an adverse
constitutional ruling.
5. Cause of action theory distinguished.
Understanding the “jointness” problem to which standing responds
shows that both the courts and commentators at least partially
misunderstand the nature and function of the doctrine. Standing is not about
the identity of the plaintiff, as doctrine would have it. Nor is it simply about
whether the plaintiff has a legally protected right, as critics of the doctrine
claim. Rather, the standing problem arises because of the nature of the
challenged action.
In the account of standing given here, the doctrine does its work
precisely when a plaintiff has a genuine cause of action but the social costs
of entertaining it exceed the plaintiff’s valuation of his entitlement but
transactions costs block an efficient solution. This account accepts the
criticism of standing doctrine that an individual who claims to be injured by
a violation of his constitutional rights cannot be presumed to be a liar at the
pleading stage. At the same time, it rejects the critics’ view that the sole
question is whether the statute gives individuals such as the plaintiff a cause
of action. Because even if it does, one must ask whether the individual
causes of action overlap, and if this will result in socially suboptimal
allocations of the individual rights.
This does not deny the importance of the academic criticism of standing
– no doubt courts sometimes deny standing based on implicit judgments
about whether the plaintiff can state a claim, or hostility to the kind of rights
the plaintiff asserts.42 Using standing to discuss substance is unjustifiable –
and in such situation, standing can not be expected to solve jointness
problems because there may be no jointness problem to solve. Standing
42

See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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does not serve efficiency purposes simply by being invoked by a court; it
needs to be invoked in response to a particular structure of challenged
conduct and distributed rights. However, this Article shows that there is an
autonomous role for standing doctrine, entirely separate from the merits,
and when used in this role, the doctrine serves broad social ends.
C. Denying Standing
The definition introduced Part II.B.1 only identifies situations that might
raise the problems to which standing responds. It does not mean that
denying standing is the best response in all such situations. The denial of
standing on transaction cost grounds must depend on at least two additional
determinations. First, that the plaintiff is not the high-value user – that is,
that the buy-out of an injunction would be the socially desirable outcome.
Second, that transaction costs would likely frustrate such an efficient
resolution between the plaintiff and higher-value users.
The first inquiry in particular risks being impressionistic and ad hoc.
Judges, especially before discovery, have little direct evidence of the
plaintiff’s valuation of her entitlement, and even less about the valuations of
the myriad absent entitlement holders. To be sure, a court is not entirely
without information about the valuations of the large mass of non-litigious
entitlement holders. As many commentators have noted, the fact that the
plaintiff’s preferred use differs from that of the great majority of other
entitlement holders can be inferred from the mere fact that the plaintiff,
unlike others, has chosen to seek judicial remedies. What it does not know
is whether those who do not pursue remedies are indifferent, or whether
they have a definite preference for waiver.
This suggests that not every case raising standing problems requires a
denial of standing answer. Rather, dismissals might be reserved for cases
where the social value determination (which it must be stressed is not a
normative one) seems clear, such as Richardson. Of course, such an
approach to standing sounds more like a prudential policy rather than a
strict jurisdictional bar, and were the Court to take such approach, standing
doctrine would seem erratic (as it currently does) in that the same kind of
injury would sometimes get standing and sometimes not. On the other hand,
one might think such pessimism is unwarranted, as the endeavor is not so
different from a court attempting to “reconstruct the hypothetical bargain”
in contract interpretation. In both situations, the court attempts to anticipate
what would happen if transaction costs did not prevent an explicit
agreement. Still, from an efficiency perspective, the lack of information
about private valuations is the main limitation or objection to the standing
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doctrine as a solution to the jointness problem.43 As Part III argues, this
objection drops away if the jointness and overlapping rights problems are
viewed from a rights-based perspective.
Once a jointness problem is identified, and the court think the plaintiff’s
might not be the highest value use, the second question arises: whether the
court needs to preempt the market because transaction costs would prevent
efficient final allocations. This is the question of whether the transaction
costs are high enough to block efficient exchange. Jointness is a matter of
degree. At the extreme end of the spectrum are single, national actions like
an inauguration, a congressional prayer or the disclosure of official
information. In these situations, the costs of liberal standing will be highest.
At the other end of the spectrum are actions with minimal rights overlap,
such co-owners Fourth Amendment search rights. These present no
jointness problems. Many cases will in middle – where the action affects a
subset of the population. Most religious display cases will be of this variety.
A Ten Commandments display in a county courthouse will affect many
people, but fewer than a national inauguration.
Again, the question of when transaction costs from group size become
high enough to threaten efficient bargains is an empirical one, and not
unique to the standing doctrine. Despite the extensive law and economics
literature on large-numbers transaction costs in private law, there is almost
no discussion of what might constitute “large.”44 Still, given what is
considered a “large group” in the experimental literature,45 it seems that all
assume that jointness on the scale created by even localized government
action would pose significant transaction problems. (Recall also that the
jointness problem is not simply one of large numbers, but also of an
indefinite and open class.)
D. The Definition Applied.
Having defined the identifying features of a transaction-cost based
standing problem and shown the differences between this and the cause-ofaction understanding of standing, this section will show how this definition
43

See James E. Krier and Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 464 (1995) (arguing that difficulty of
assessing private values argues for property rules in almost all situations).
44
See Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase
Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 149, 171 (1986) (concluding
from experiments with students that transaction costs of negotiating not prohibitive when
there are less than 38 parties). See also, Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties To Nuisance Cases
Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside The Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 382
(1999) (presenting case studies suggesting that post-injunction bargaining often does not
occur even when there are few parties).
45
See Hoffman & Spitzer, note __ supra.
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can be used to identify standing problems involving constitutional rights
that all agree create individual entitlements and causes of action. The
example shows how the function of standing described here can in
particular cases produce results different from those that would be reached
under the dominant understandings of the doctrine. The first example would
be justiciable under standing doctrine as understood by the Court, but not
under the definition presented here; the second might not be justiciable
under current doctrine but should be under the definition presented here.
1. Fourth Amendment and data mining.
Individuals subject to searches have standing to raise Fourth
Amendment objections.46 But this is not inherent in the Fourth Amendment,
rather, it is a consequence of the kinds of actions that typically violate it.
Searches take place one person, or one premise, at a time. Even if a single
police sweep targets many homes, each person can individually seek to
enjoin the search. If five out of a hundred people sue and obtain injunctions
while the other ninety-five consent, ninety-five searches can take place: the
action is divisible. The divisible nature of the defendant’s conduct means
standing questions will not arise.
Now consider a situation where standing problems can arise under the
Fourth Amendment. The government uses a data mining program to sift and
process massive amounts of anonymous personal information.47 Vast
databases from credit card companies, airlines, and others are fed into the
program, which searches for patterns suggestive of terrorist activity.
Because the information is not initially tagged with people’s names, and the
databases that are used must remain secret for the program to work, it is
impossible to seek out people’s consent to such a search. Because it is
impossible to exclude opt-outs from the program, a Fourth Amendment
challenge would raise the exact same jointness problem seen in Richardson
and Schlesinger.
The assertion of Fourth Amendment rights by one person would lead to
an injunction that would block the (potentially) consensual searches of a
vast multitude. The analysis presented here shows that though the
entitlement involved is the Fourth Amendment, the suit raises a standing
46

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding
that Fourth Amendment provides a basis for judicial relief even without a congressionallycreated cause of action).
47
This hypothetical is motivated by programs like the Computer Assisted Passenger
Profiling System II or the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness Program. It
does not attempt to faithfully represent the details of any particular data mining effort,
many of which remain classified. It is sufficient for present purposes that a program with
the characteristics described here is one the government could very realistically wish to
implement.
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problem, and the correct resolution may be to deny standing. Whether
standing should be denied will depend on a court’s estimation of what
proportion of the affected group prefer to enjoin the practice, what
proportion would consent, and the relative valuations of each.
2. Legislative standing.
In the 1970s, congressmen began to turn to the federal courts, and in
particular, the D.C. Circuit to challenge actions by the Executive or even
their own house.48 The question is whether they have standing on the
ground that the action weakens the power of their office or branch.49 The
Supreme Court only recently entered the fray, denying standing to a few
members of the House and Senate who challenged the Line Item Veto Act
on separation of powers grounds.50 The plaintiffs argued that if the
president could unbundle legislation, it reduces the voting power of each
legislator. The Court found this too “abstract and widely dispersed” to
constitute an “injury-in-fact.”
In terms of the transaction-cost function of standing, Raines appears
unjustified. Congress consists of a relatively small number of people, whose
identities are known and fixed. Legislators and Congress as in institution
can be successfully negotiated with either by other legislators or the
Executive Branch; it happens every day.
There may be a concern that allowing individual legislator standing
effectively creates a one-congressman veto, far different from the majority
rule envisioned by Art. I. But it will exist only if the challenged action is
actually unconstitutional; the veto is not the legislator’s but the
Constitution’s. Unlike in the situations discussed above, there is nothing
about the transaction costs would prevent effective bargaining.
E. Objections.
The discussion has assumed that rights can be understood in the
48

FALLON, MELTZER HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM at 165.
49
The D.C. Circuit has generally allowed such suits. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson,
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that senator has standing to challenge
constitutionality of pocket veto because it negates his vote for the vetoed legislation);
Mitchell v. Laird (holding that congressmen have standing to challenge Vietnam War on
separation of powers grounds but dismissing on political question grounds); Nader v. Bork,
366 F. Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1973) (finding legislative standing but no citizen standing to
challenge firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor). But see Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
F.2d 1307, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1973) (holding that congresswoman lacks standing to challenge
Vietnam War on separation of powers grounds)
50
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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fundamentally utilitarian Coasean framework. Now two broad objections
will be addressed. Much of liberal constitutional theory holds that rights are
“trumps,” and rejects the notion that they should yield to even powerful
social welfare considerations.51 This is a radically individualistic
understanding of rights – each individual’s exercise of her rights supersedes
all communal considerations.52
The second objection regards constitutional rights as merit goods,
designed to protect not only or even primarily the individual entitlementholders, but rather broader social interests.53 Assigning these rights to
individuals is merely a convenient enforcement tool since they will have the
most immediate knowledge of violations and the greatest incentive to
litigate. However, individuals’ private valuations of their rights do not
reflect the social benefit of exercising the right. In this view, there is cause
to celebrate if liberal standing, by preventing settlement, blocks
encroachments on constitutional entitlements. The inefficiencies that might
result from liberal standing are illusory, in that they are calculated solely on
the parties’ private valuations, disregarding the even larger merit good value
of the right. Liberal standing, by making rights effectively inalienable, gets
the results argued for by Owen Fiss’s radical Against Settlement position54
through a backdoor – a good thing if one thinks there is no such thing as an
efficient violation of constitutional rights.
The rights-as-trumps argument will be dealt with more fully in the next
Part; the merit good argument will be considered here. Undoubtedly the
exercise of constitutional entitlements can have structural benefits, and an
individual’s valuation of a right may not capture all the positive
externalities of its exercise. The value of a right can have both private and
public components. However, determining what portion of right’s value is
the private value and what is the additional merit value is difficult. Saying
there is some broader value not reflected in individuals’ valuations does not
meant the efficient level of constitutional violation is zero – yet a liberal
standing regime will result in a zero level so long as one person is willing to
sue. Similarly, saying private valuation captures much of the value in a right
does not mean it captures all of it. Thus there could be cases where the sum
51

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977) (“[T]he prospect of
utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing a man from doing what he has a right to do.”).
52
See Richard Pildes, Rights are Not Trumps, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725 (1988).
53
See REDISH, POLITICAL ORDER at 93-95 (arguing that issues involved in litigation go
far beyond the interests of the particular plaintiff, and thus injury-in-fact requirement
artificially limits ability of courts to vindicate those interests); Tribe, Inalienable Rights, 99
HARV. L. REV. at 332-3334 (arguing that there are a some rights that are not individual but
try to structure society in particular ways, and “individuals cannot waive them because
individuals are not their sole focus”).
54
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)
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of the plaintiff’s private value and the merit good value exceeds the
aggregate of the private valuations on the other side. This mean that a denial
of standing is not always the correct response to a transaction-cost based
standing problem.
The goal here is not to make a normative case for a private-rights view
of the constitution. The only contention is that there is nothing artificial or
unfaithful to the constitutional system in describing standing as a way to
safeguard against social welfare losses where social welfare is measured as
the aggregate of private values. The design of our system of rights is
premised on individual values being good proxies for public values. This is
suggested by the central role of individuals in asserting constitutional rights.
As will be discussed in more detail in Part III, constitutional rights are
freely alienable at the discretion of their individual holders. They can be
contracted away for consideration or waived for no reason at all. If a person,
or group of people, wish to tolerate a violation of their constitutional
entitlements, nothing in the law can compel them to stand on their rights.
There is no doctrine of misprision of constitutional violations, as there is for
felonies. The vast flexibility which individuals have in disposing of their
constitutional entitlements suggests the system is based on an assumption
that there is little slippage between the public and private value of right
assertion.
This function of standing is not based on any independent view of the
public value of rights. Rather, on the face of prohibitive transaction costs,
standing attempts to replicate as closely as possible the situation that would
obtain if transaction costs were low. Recall that the efficiency-promoting
property of standing is purely an artifact of jointness, which is entirely a
matter of circumstances, lacking any value-content. When a single
individual chooses to waive or settle a constitutional entitlement – by
agreeing to suppress a newspaper story, for example, the merit good value
of asserting the constitutional right is forfeit. The ubiquity of such waivers
and the general tolerance of them, suggests that at least on the individual
scale, the merit good component of rights is less than its private value.
Jointness simply involves the aggregation of many private and merit good
values across many people; the ratio of the private to merit value does not
necessarily change when many are injured. It seems artificial to think
individuals are the best judges of the value of their entitlements when the
government violates them serially, but not when the government violates
them simultaneously. Indeed, settlement is permitted in class action suits
involving constitutional rights – even when the settlement does fully
vindicate the interests of some class members.55 Thus even in group
55

See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1997 (7th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) which held
that the constitutional status of class action claims does not prevent their settlement:
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litigation involving public rights, individual valuations play the leading role.
Jointness may sometimes result in a conflict between maximizing the
private and public value of an entitlement. Thus far, only corner solutions
have been considered: denying the private value (liberal standing) or the
public value (narrow standing). One does not need to deny the reality of
public value to think that when it is in tension with private value, the
outcome should depend on whether the aggregate private loss exceeds the
public value. Parts IV will alternatives solutions that would at least partially
vindicate both interests.

III. STANDING AS PROTECTION FOR RIGHTS
Understanding the jointness problem allows one to recognize another
publicly-minded function of the injury-in-fact requirement: protecting
individuals’ choices about the exercise of their rights. This Part develops a
new account of standing that parallels the transaction-cost account in Part
II. Here, however, the Coasean framework is set aside in favor of a rightsbased approach. As will be seen, jointness produces undesirable outcomes
in a framework that treats rights as incommensurable or trumps.
This Part also responds to a series of related objections to the jointness
theory of standing. Recall the “rights-as-trumps” objection raised in Part
II.E. Constitutional theory does not typically conceptualize constitutional
rights as “resources” or “entitlements,” so the notion that constitutional law
should direct them towards their highest-value use may seem odd.
Moreover, many believe that for reasons of incommensurability,
constitutional rights cannot be reduced to the arithmetic of efficiency.
Furthermore, constitutional rights are a response to fears of majoritarian
exploitation. Individual rights loose their luster if they do not protect the
unpopular activity of the few, or even the one. One might think the
efficiency function of standing is illegitimate, as it contemplates sacrificing
the rights of a few to satisfy majoritarian preferences.56
This Part shows that because of the jointness phenomenon, liberal
standing has consequences that can be measured purely in terms of
individual rights. The rights of the plaintiff whose standing is in question
Where . . . constitutional claims are asserted, we recognize that public
interests may potentially conflict with the desire of the parties to settle their
dispute. The presence of constitutional claims does not, however, prevent us from
applying the principles that guide our review which allow ample room for
settlement and compromise.
56
See REDISH, POLITICAL ORDER at 93-95 (arguing that injury-in-fact requirement
interferes with Court’s function as a counter-majoritarian check of the political branches);
Epstein, Standing and Spending, at 34.
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conflict not merely with the preferences or welfare of others, but with their
own constitutional rights. Thus standing problems represent not just a tradeoff between the vindication of constitutional rights and the maximization of
social welfare; they also represent a “rights-rights” trade-off.57 The
efficiency and rights-based functions of standing are isomorphic but
logically and doctrinally distinct. They also have different normative
implications, with the rights-based function more clearly supporting a
robust standing doctrine than the more fact-dependent efficiency function.
A. Two sides of rights.
1. Non-exercise and waiver.
An important but often overlooked portion of a legal entitlement is the
right to not exercise it through litigation. One need not bring all causes of
action one possesses. One can waive one’s rights because of distaste for
litigation, a desire to maintain good relations with others, or any other
reason. This is evident for standard tort or contract causes of action. As
first-year students realize, with a chill, when reading Vosburg v. Putney, tort
causes of action accrue all the time; it is mostly the aggrieved entitlement
holders’ private decisions not to exercise their rights that keeps the courts
from being flooded with claims of assault.58 Torts occur far more often than
they are litigated because rights-holders choose to not assert them.
The same is true of constitutional rights, as will be developed below.
Constitutional rights give their bearers the option to block governmental
action, but they do not require them to do so.59 They can exercise their right,
relinquish it in exchange for some consideration, to avoid social stigma, or
waive it for no reason at all. In Calabresi & Melamed terms, constitutional
rights are protected by property rules rather than inalienability rules.60
57

See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION at 258.
See Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (suggesting courts could not
function were it not for the high rate of plea bargains by criminal defendants).
59
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 3017 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining is underpinned by the “autonomy
value” of rights, defined as “the right to waive one’s rights as one method of exercising
them”). See generally, Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1217 (1990) (“[O]urs is primarily
a market economy and that economic structure has inescapable implications for the
meaning and operation of constitutional rights,” such as the fact that the exercise of rights
has an explicit or implicit price).
60
The picture is actually more complicated. Inalienability is a matter of degree, and
almost all rights are inalienable in some weak sense. A right is inalienable in the strongest
sense if it cannot be waived or bargained away in whole or in part for any reason. Perhaps
only the Thirteenth Amendment is inalienable in this sense. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219, 241-43 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (holding unenforceable a voluntary personal service
58
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Injunctive relief is not automatically activated when the entitlement is
threatened; equity only acts at the petition of the rights-holder. As with
private law property rules, the option to enjoin the government simply sets
the maximum price at which the entitlement can be taken, namely, the
owner’s reservation price. This can be zero, or even negative (which would
mean the owner would not only waive the right, but pay the government to
take the action).
2. Constitutional entitlements.
While constitutional entitlements are regarded as more solemn than
common law or statutory ones, they are generally waivable like ordinary
tort rights.61 This is most evident for the Constitution’s numerous rights for
criminal defendants.62 To take a ubiquitous example, plea bargains waive
the Fifth Amendment right to liberty63 in exchange for favorable
consideration from the prosecutor, to avoid the bother or embarrassment of
trial, a desire to pay for one’s crime, or no reason at all. A plea-bargain also
contract that contemplates enforcement through specific performance or punitive damages).
See also, Kontorovich, Liability Rules, at 763-64 n.18 (describing Thirteenth Amendment’s
ban on “involuntary servitude” as a inalienability rule); Kreimer, 132 U. PA. L. REV. at
1293. A weaker inalienability forbids trading the right, but allows simple waiver and
abandonment. The right to vote is of this kind. One cannot sell it, but one can waive it, as
most people do. (By contrast, in many Western nations, voting is obligatory because it is
seen as serving primarily public; the absence of such laws in the U.S. is due in part to the
presumptive waivability of rights.)
In the weakest version, one simply cannot permanently waive or trade all of the
protection afforded by an entitlement. For example, one cannot permanently shrug off
Fourth Amendment protection with a single act. Most if not all constitutional rights are
inalienable in this very loose sense. However, the right to object to particular actions is a
component of the broader entitlement. And while the latter can be inalienable as a whole,
the smaller parts are alienable, and indeed, the sum of the parts can alienable. But this very
narrow kind of inalienability of constitutional rights has nothing to do with constitutional
values. One also cannot contract away one’s ability in general to make contracts, or to be
protected by the tort system, though one can contract away one’s ability to make contracts
with particular people or to recover for torts in certain circumstances.
61
Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that “most
constitutional rights are waivable”). See Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARV. L. REV. 330 (1985) (“In our constitutional system, rights tend to be individual,
alienable…. [and] subject to boding waiver or alienation.”)
62
See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 871 (2003) (observing
that while the “waiver doctrine” generally permits forfeiting or even bargaining away
criminal defense rights in exchange for some benefit from the government, the parallel
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions severely restricts individuals’ ability to bargain
away First Amendment rights).
63
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378 (1982) (noting legitimacy of plea
bargaining).
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waives all constitutional trial rights, such as the right not to incriminate
oneself, the right to a jury, and the confrontation right. All of these rights
can also be waived with or without consideration from the government.64
The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to a lawyer. This
right is considered important enough that suspects must be informed of it
upon their arrest, and government must pay for counsel for those who
cannot afford them. However, defendants can forgo the entitlement to
counsel even for idiosyncratic or foolish reasons,65 and even if this does not
serve the broader social end of justice, in the sense of the search for the
objective truth or the restraint of governmental misconduct. The individual
controls the disposition of his entitlements because he bears the immediate
and most salient consequences of his choices, not because he bears all the
consequences.66
The ability to bargain away constitutional rights for something of
greater value is not peculiar to criminal procedure. People can block
unwarranted searches of their homes or belongings. But they can also
consent to such searches. This right is often waived because the entitlement
holder feels the governmental action benefits him more than it harms him.
For example, someone may consent to a search to be assured that a
dangerous fugitive is not hiding in his house. More generally, someone
might forgo the right to avoid unwarranted searches because they estimate
the cooperation with the police generally facilitates law enforcement and
produces social benefits that outweigh the intrusion of the search. The
crucial point is that the individual himself, and no one else, weighs the
benefits of the government action relative to the intrusion on his
constitutionally-protected privacy.
Journalists have a First Amendment right to publish at least some
national security-related information over the government’s objection.
However, the press can waive this right by agreeing to not publish the
information at the government’s request. This consent might be given out a
belief that the national security interests involve trump the informational
64

To be sure, plea agreements are policed by the court for voluntariness and the like.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prevents, in certain circumstances, the
government from leveraging its market power in one context to extract concessions in
another. But this does not take any of the constitutional entitlements involved out of the
general paradigm of alienability. Even the right to contract away entitlements in private law
is limited at the margins by judicial policing against fraud and overreaching, akin to review
of plea agreements. And the ability to transfer rights through contracting is limited by
antitrust restrictions on tying arrangements. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1988).
65
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 801 (1975).
66
Id. (noting that the “right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”).
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ones, even in a situation in which a court would strike this balance
differently. Such a waiver of First Amendment privileges can even be
granted for purely self-interested reasons -- to avoid alienating readers or
for promises of scoops in the future.
The ability to consent to unconstitutional activity is evident from the
recent cases invalidating long-standing public religious displays, such as the
Ten Commandments. Presumably these displays were unconstitutional
since their inception,67 thus violating the rights of tens of thousands of
individuals. That a case only emerged after several decades of ongoing
violation shows that all the affected individuals chose to forgo the judicial
assertion of their rights, presumably because the value they attached to the
display was greater than the value they attached to their Establishment right
net of litigation costs.
The waiver or consent discussed here, like the bargains discussed in Part
II, are usually informal and implicit – an entitlement holder simply does not
bring a legal action. But constitutional entitlements can also be contracted
away in a formal manner.68 A rights holder can brings a suit against the
government and then settle it. The settlement extinguishes his right to sue,
in exchange for some consideration – and a settlement of a constitutional
claim is simply a common law contract.69
B. Rights-rights trade-offs
The role of the standing doctrine as a response to jointness problems can
now be described. As we have seen, constitutional rights can generally be
waived or contracted away. Each individual can decide how to use their
right – negatively or affirmatively. But under conditions of jointness,
people cannot choose individually to trade their rights. The active exercise
by one party precludes the passive exercise by all others. If the passive
exercise is understood as a legitimate way of exercising rights, then the one
plaintiff limits all the other entitlement holders’ ability to exercise their
rights as they see fit.
A constitutional entitlement’s value to its owner has two relevant
67

Indeed, the Court suggested that time may blunt their illegality.
See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assoc., 442 F.3d
410, 446 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Most individually held constitutional rights may be waived. . .
Some constitutional rights are so obviously alienable that no one would challenge the
idea.”); Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(“]C]onstitutional [free expression] rights, like rights and privileges of lesser importance,
may be contractually waived”).
69
Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because the
parties are not diverse, any suit to enforce the settlement agreement . . . would have to be
brought in state court even though the settlement was of federal . . . claims.”)
68
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components. Part of its value comes from being able to use it affirmatively,
to be free of conduct that violates the entitlement. Part of the value consists
in the option to waive or trade it. This is the option value of the entitlement.
Even if the entitlement holder would never actually trade it, the power to do
so in the future has some real present value. Thus an action by a third party
that prevents alienability destroys part of the right’s value.70 In Richardson,
for example, if even one individual brings suit, everyone else can no longer
exercise their individual option to sue or not sue; to know or not know. If
part of the value of a right is the ability to not exercise it, then the Accounts
Clause plaintiff diminishes the value of everyone else’s right – he interferes
with their ability to use their right as they see fit by rendering any waiver
moot.
The important point here is the tension is not between one person’s
exercise of his constitutional entitlement and the naked majoritarian
preferences of others. Everyone has just as much rights at stake. The ability
to waive a right is ultimately a product of the right. And thus the tension is
between rights on one hand and rights on the other. Even if one thinks that
the “right of way” should be given to the affirmative exercise of a right as
against the passive exercise, this does not say how to deal with a situation
where there is one affirmative exercise on one side, and a thousand passive
exercises on the other.
Because one person’s exercise of his right implicates everyone else’s
exercise of theirs, it becomes clear that all proper uses of the standing
doctrine are in an important sense about third-party standing or jus tertii.71
This is a prudential doctrine that prohibits a plaintiff from litigating the
rights of others, even when there is a cognizable injury to the absent party.
The Court has observed that a reason to deny standing when “the rights of
third parties are implicated [is] the avoidance of the adjudication of rights
which those not before the Court may not wish to assert.”72 The analysis
here shows that all true injury-in-fact problems are in part third party
standing problems. In situations of jointness, a party seeking to vindicate his
own rights necessarily litigates the rights of others as well.

70

See Frank J. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347:
One aspect of the value of a right--whether a constitutional right or title to
land--is that it can be sold and both parties to the bargain made better off. A right
that cannot be sold is worth less than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold.
Those who believe in the value of constitutional rights should endorse their
exercise by sale as well as their exercise by other action.
71
See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at 598.
72
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978)
(emphasis added).
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C. Alienability as a Right
One might object that the right to waive or trade a constitutional
entitlement is not of the same dimension or magnitude as the right to
exercise it. The right to be free of governmental conduct might not include
the right to consent to it. Of course, consent is allowed – but this may be for
practical rather than constitutional reasons. The waiver right might be
thought of as a second-order, derivative right. One might sharpen this
argument and contend that the right to waive constitutional rights is not
itself a constitutional right at all, but merely a consequence of having
constitutional rights in a system of private litigation. The consequence is
tolerated, but not protected.
Such a conception of the waiver right is plausible, but not obviously
correct. The alienability of rights seems to be not an accident, but a feature,
albeit implicit, of the system of constitutional entitlements. That is, the
waivability of constitutional protections is the constitutional default, as
evidenced by inalienability having to be a specified exception. To put it
differently, if the inalienability of certain rights is a matter of constitutional
law, it suggests, until demonstrated otherwise, the alienability (through
contract or waiver) of the majority of rights is also a matter of constitutional
law. Thus alienability is itself a constitutionally protected interest. Finally,
accepting the passive use of a right as being part of the right itself does not
require believing that it is as important as the affirmative use. One need
only believe that both are aspects of the same right. For if the alienability
right is relatively less important than the exercise right, but both are
“rights,” than the alienability rights of many people might trump the
exercise rights of a few.
There is little law or scholarship on this question, no doubt because
waived rights do not give rise to cases. The few Supreme Court cases
touching on this issue will now be examined closely. The cases are
ultimately inconclusive, but they suggest, especially the more recent ones,
that the non-exercise of a right is part of the protected autonomy interest
conferred by the right.
1. Singer v. United States & Faretta v. California..
The two occasions on which the Supreme Court has most explicitly
considered these questions (both times with respect to trial procedure
rights), it has come to different conclusions. In Singer v. United States,73 a
criminal defendant wanted, against the prosecutor’s wishes, to waive his
right to a jury and have his case tried to the bench.74 He premised his
73
74

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
Id. at 26 (“Petitioner further urges that since a defendant can waive other
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argument on the general waivability of constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court upheld the trial judge’s refusal to allow the waiver – not because
there jury right cannot be waived, but because the Constitution does not
affirmatively give anyone a right to a bench trial.75 While the court found
the defendant did have the “ability” to waive a jury if the judge and
prosecutor agreed, it went on to find that the “defendant’s only
constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an impartial trial by
jury.”76 This language could suggest that the waiver right is of a lesser
dimension, and perhaps different source, than this substantive right.
Singer would lead some to think that a defendant has no right to
refuse counsel,77 yet ten later the Court in Faretta held that the right to
counsel does include a right to waive counsel. The Court reconciled Singer
by taking an implied rights approach. The Court concluded that the right to
assistance of counsel implies, by virtue of its goals and history, a
substantive right to no counsel – this is not a waiver right, but a substantive
right of its own. On the other hand, nothing about the history or purposes of
a public trial right suggests it needs to be supported with an implicit right to
a bench trial alternative.78 The entire discussion is thus framed not in terms
of whether one has a right to waive rights, but whether one has a right to
particular outcomes. As a result, Faretta attempts to reconcile itself with
Singer by saying that there is no general answer to the waiver question, but
rather a separate inquiry for each right. Of course, this smacks of ad
hockery - a desire to limit the previous case to its facts.79 The Court does
note in a dictum that a “defendant’s power to waive [a] right” does not
“mechanically” give rise to a constitutional “right” to waiver, but rather a
right-by-right analysis is required.80
There is a better way to understand these cases. They simply mean that
a negative right cannot be transformed into an affirmative one. As is well
known, constitutional law disfavors the creation of affirmative duties from
the government to citizens. In the typical waiver context, the individual has
constitutional rights without the consent of the Government, he must necessarily have a
similar right to waive a jury trial.”).
75
Id. at 34.
76
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added).
77
See, e.g., People v. Sharp, P.2d 489, 493 (Cal. 1972) (“[C]onstitutional language
granting the right to the assistance of counsel lends no express support to a claim that an
accused has the constitutional right to defend without counsel. . . the right to waive a
constitutional protection is not itself necessarily a right of constitutional dimensions.”),
citing Singer.
78
Singer, 380 U.S. at 28-33.
79
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 n.15 (noting that the decision is not a “mechanical”
application of previous principles).
80
Id. (emphasis added).
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an entitlement to be free of certain action; the waiver allows the action to
take place but does not obligate the government to do it. If a citizen sees a
police officer on the street, stops her and consents to be searched, the officer
is not obligated by the fact of the citizen’s waiver to search him. The officer
simply has the option. Similarly, in a plea negotiation, the defendant’s
desire to plead guilty does not obligate the government to accept a plea.
However, in the trial context, there are two options, judge or jury, each
of which must be provided by the government. Because there are only two
options, waiver in effect creates an affirmative right, that is, obligates the
government to provide the defendant with a particular thing, here, a bench
trial. Given the reluctance to find affirmative governmental obligations in
the constitution, the Singer result is not surprising. The case does not hold
that having a right does not generally come with the right to waive it, but
rather that “the ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily
carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.”81 In Faretta,
by contrast, the defendant starts with that rare creature, an affirmative
constitutional entitlement, and wishes to waive it. Here the waiver does not
obligate the government to provide the entitlement holder with anything at
all, and so waiver is allowed by right.
2. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow82
Both views of the relative value of the two aspects of an entitlement (the
right to assert it offensively and the right to waive or trade it) can find
support in two recent Supreme Court cases.83 In an overlooked part of the
first case, the Court described an entitlement holder’s desire to acquiesce to
a constitutional violation as a “constitutionally protectable interest” in its
own right.84 Regrettably, the Court did not expand on this characterization.
However, a closer look at the facts of the case reveals a microcosm of the
jointness problem, which the Court resolves by favoring the waiver interest
over the exercise interest.
Newdow, whose daughter attends California public schools, brought as
her next friend an Establishment and Free Exercise challenge against the
mention of “G-d” in the Pledge of Allegiance recited at school. He claimed
the girl was, like him, an atheist, and thus put upon by the state-sponsored
religious reference. The girl’s mother, who had joint custody, intervened to
argue that the child was actually a Christian who did not mind the Pledge
and would be harmed if it were repealed.85
81

Singer, 380 U.S. at 28-33.
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
83
Compare id. with Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1523-24 (2006).
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Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 15 n.7 (citation omitted).
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Id. at 9.
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The dispute between Newdow and the mother can be seen as a jus tertii
question. Various third parties seek to espouse the interests of a principal,
and it is unclear which advocate, if any, of them truly represents the
interests of the principal; but it is clear the third-parties claims are
derivative. Such cases are properly treated as outside the core of the
standing inquiry. What is interesting here is that the dispute between the
child’s potential representatives focused not on how to best assert her
constitutional rights, but rather on whether affirmative assertion or waiver
had the greatest net benefits.
In other words, there are two joint owners of the right to espouse the
child’s claims. One wishes to use that right to challenge a highly colorable
violation of the child’s constitutional rights (and presumably those of other
schoolchildren); the other whishes to use the rights by not using them.
(Unlike other third party standing cases, there is no possibility that the
principal will eventually resolve the matter directly.) Thus the parents are
effectively co-owners of the right to bring the Establishment challenge, but
they disagree on the highest value use of this right.86 Each has veto power
over the other’s preferred use, and it can not be split down the middle.
The Court explained its decision in favor of the mother by noting that
she seemed to have the slight preponderance of custody under state law -though the division of custody is admittedly unclear, and silent on the
question of legal assertion of rights. A few words in a custody order is an
extraordinary basis on which to decide a dispute about the highest-value use
of an entitlement to challenge unconstitutional government action.
What is particularly noteworthy is what the Court did not do: it could
have refereed between the two irreconcilable claims by throwing the tie to
the side that wishes to use the entitlement affirmatively. This is exactly
what the court of appeals had done below:
[The mother] has no power, even as sole legal custodian,
to insist that her child be subjected to unconstitutional state
action. Newdow’s assertion of his retained parental rights in
this case, therefore, simply cannot be legally incompatible
with any power Banning may hold pursuant to the custody
order. Further, Ms. Banning may not consent to
unconstitutional government action in derogation of
Newdow’s rights or waive Newdow’s right to enforce his
constitutional interests.87
Such reasoning finds no expression in the Court’s opinion reversing the
Ninth Circuit. On the contrary, for the Court, preventing violations of
86
87

Id. at 15 (“Newdow’s rights . . . cannot be viewed in isolation.”).
Newdow v. United States Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2002).
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constitutional rights (the daughter’s and others) is not an automatic trump
value. The Court recognized that a party whose constitutional rights are
being violated may prefer to waive those rights if they think the benefits
(here, the primary benefit was avoiding social opprobrium) justify it and
that such a preference is legitimate. Indeed, such a preference may dominate
a contrary one even when this entails preventing another party from
exercising their constitutional entitlement.88
3. Georgia v. Randolph89
The case began with a wife’s domestic violence call. When the police
asked for permission to search the house, the wife consented – but her
husband vociferously objected. The Court held that the husband’s veto
made the search unconstitutional “as to him.” The wife could consent to a
search of the home, but so long as the husband was there objecting, the
search could not be applied “to him.” This is an attempt to disaggregated
the simple overlapping entitlement, and as Justice Scalia shows in his
dissent, even at this level the cut is sloppy: if the search is valid “as to her,”
would not the plain sight rule also allow the search to spill over to the drug
paraphernalia the husband had left out?90 Carving out opt-outs when
entitlements overlap is not easy.
Here, two people have overlapping entitlements in the privacy of their
home. One wishes to trade the entitlement (for a police search), the other to
use it affirmatively. The Court throws the tie to the affirmative use of the
entitlement: “In the balancing of competing individual and governmental
interests entailed by the bar to unreasonable searches the cooperative
occupant's invitation adds nothing to the government’s side to counter the
force of an objecting individual's claim to security against the government's
intrusion into his dwelling place.”91 The Court here treats the affirmative
use of the right as outweighing the waiver use. However, it does not treat
the affirmative use as a trump: the affirmative use is explicitly weighed
against the other side’s various possible interests in consenting, which the
Court treats quite seriously. The balancing is based partly on a belief that
the interests of the consenting party could be served through other means
that do not sacrifice the objector’s right, while the opposite is not true.
Of course, the Court was dealing with a simple two-party situation,
88

Newdow had also raised constitutional claims in his own name, to the effect that the
Establishment violation harmed his ability to teach his daughter his religious views. See
Elk Grove Village at 16-17. This claim also overlapped with the daughter’s Establishment
clause right, in that its successful exercise would prevent the daughter from acquiescing.
The Court denied standing for this claim as well without any additional explanation.
89
126 S.Ct.1515, 1523-24 (2006).
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126 S.Ct. at 1536.
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Id. at 1523-24.

38

STANDING

[27-Mar-07

where there is no reason to prefer the consent use to the affirmative use
(though there were on the facts of the case: the police had come on a
domestic abuse call from the woman). The balance might look quite
different with one objector out of ten thousand. After all, Elk Grove Village
v. Newdow could be thought of as a case about three people with a rightsinterest in a jointed action – Newdow, the daughter, and her mother. Two
out of three favor waiver, and waiver wins the day.

IV. ALTERNATIVES TO STANDING: DISAGGREGATING JOINTNESS
This Part considers whether the jointness problem can be better dealt
with through methods other than standing restrictions. The problem shows
explains what is at stake in crafting standing doctrine. It does not
demonstrate that the right response should be to adopt a restrictive standing
regime. While standing can avert massive social losses and interference
with people’s exercise of their rights, it is not costless. Standing cuts the
transaction-cost knot by entirely denying relief to plaintiffs, leaving them
with uncompensated losses. This downside of standing is purely
distributional. The second – and socially more important – cost of standing
involves the merit good component of constitutional rights. To the extent
that constitutional litigation is a vehicle for the vindication of broader social
interests, the denial of standing frustrates this goal. For example, it limits
the production of the public good of precedent regarding permissible
government conduct.92
A. Liability Rules
The typical judicial remedy for a jointness problem in other contexts
is not to deny relief but rather to make it monetary rather than injunctive –
to switch from a property rule to a liability rule. The jointness problem is, as
has been seen, one of high transaction costs arising from a large number of
disorganized entitlement holders, and the potential of strategic holdout
among them. In such situations, Calabresi and Melamed famously found
that the socially preferable solution would be to switch from the property
rule protection that generally accompanies private law rights to liability rule
protection – thus allowing a nonconsensual buy-out of the aggrieved
parties’ entitlements at a judicially-determined price.93 Generally an
entitlement is either protected by property rules or liability rules all of the
92

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEG. STUD. 235, 240 (1979) (identifying precedent as a public good).
93
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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time, but when transaction costs change dramatically, a switch in the
remedial regime would be warranted. Calabresi & Melamed suggested as
much, and while their theory has had limited effect on the nuisance
entitlements that they took as their subject, it is descriptive of the legal
response to such problems in other areas.94 In private law, one sees this in
minority shareholders’ rights in corporate law,95 and in constitutional law, a
switch to liability rules can be found in the Takings Clause.96
A response along these lines that could be an alternative to standing
would be to take injunctive relief off the table in jointness situations. One
might say standing exists only at law, not in equity. The remedy would be
monetary, the court’s estimation of compensatory damages for the
plaintiff’s injury. Injunctive relief is binary, while monetary relief is
continuous. To the extent a court can value a person’s individual stake in a
de facto joint entitlement; it can effectively separate the entitlement into
multiple awards of monetary relief.97
Liability rules would capture many of the benefits of restrictive standing
while also incorporating some of the advantages of the liberal approach. It
avoids the potentially massive social losses that arise from property rule
protection when rights are inalienable. At the same time, unlike the current
standing doctrine, it does not simply let losses lie where they fall, but rather
grants some measure of recompense to those aggrieved by the governmental
action. Perhaps more importantly, it allows the courts to address the merits
of plaintiffs’ claims, giving them occasion to pronounce on the
constitutionality of government action. This has expressive,98
precedential,99 and educational100 benefits that should not be
94

See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1,
5-6 (2002).
95
See id. at 33-39 (describing appraisal right, essential facilities doctrine, and other
private law rules as “pliability rules”).
96
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.; see Kontorovich, Liability Rules, 56 STANFORD L. REV. at
__ (describing current and possible constitutional pliability rules).
97
Professor Fallon has recently noted that standing doctrine seems motivated by
concern about cost of injunctive remedies, in particular, ongoing supervisory decrees, and
such concerns would fall away in a damages regime. Fallon, Remedies, supra note _, at
650-651, 665-66. While the solution may be similar, this is an entirely different remedial
concern from the one discussed here, which focuses on the inability to buy out an
inefficient injunction due to transaction costs.
98
See Amar, supra, at 718 (arguing that law-declaring function of court argues for a
relaxation of standing restrictions). See generally, Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69 (1996) (arguing that decisions of the Court
“and may well have major social effects just by virtue of their status as communication”).
99
An existing judicial determination of the issue could be used to get an injunction in
such subsequent cases where jointness is not a problem. Moreover, establishing precedent
on constitutional issues has become particularly important given qualified immunity and
the new standard for federal habeas petitions. See generally, John C. Jeffries, Jr., The
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underestimated. A determination that the government is acting illegally
would impose a potentially large shaming penalty on officials.
B. Problems With Liability Rules
When high transaction costs prevent bargaining, property rules threaten
to lock in inefficient resource allocations. The (academically) accepted
solution is to protect the entitlements with liability rules, which allow for
forced takings at a judicially-determined price. Instead, what standing
doctrine does when confronted with a jointness problem is to switch from
the robust property rule default to a rule of zero protection. This section will
explore the limitations of liability rules as an alternative to standing
restrictions. These limitations may explain why standing effectively
eliminates the plaintiff’s entitlement, rather than cashing it out with liability
rules. One reason may be “injunctive essentialism” -- a mistaken
assumption that constitutional plaintiffs are always entitled to property rule
protection. Furthermore, liability rules would create a new set of problems valuing the entitlements and screening out opportunistic plaintiffs - that
may be as serious as those under property rules.
1. Injunctive essentialism.
In private law, entitlements can be protected either through liability or
property rules. Whether an entitlement will be protected with liability or
property rules often turns on whether transaction costs are high enough to
block efficient trade.101 The situation is quite different for constitutional
entitlements, which are thought to require, by their very nature, property
rule protection.102 Those subject to an ongoing or prospective constitutional
violation are presumptively entitled to an injunction.103 Nothing in
constitutional law dictates property rules as the sole protective regime.
Indeed, constitutional law uses liability rules in a surprising number of
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L. J. 87 (1999) (arguing the qualified
immunity doctrine encourages courts to develop constitutional law deferring the full costs
of doing so).
100
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992)
101
See Calabresi & Melamed.
102
See CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAYE KANE, 11A
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2944 (“[I]f a constitutional violation is established,
usually no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary”) (2006); id. at § 2948.1 n.21
(collecting cases); Laycock at 57 (“Injunctions are routine in all civil rights and
constitutional litigation.”)
103
See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of
Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 758 (2004) (demonstrating the general belief in a
near-automatic right to injunctions for constitutional violations).
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situations generally characterized by high transaction costs.104 And the
structure of the Bill of Rights suggests liability or property are equally valid
options when, as is almost always the case, the Constitution specifies only
the substance of the entitlement but not the remedial regime.105
Nonetheless, there is a belief among judges and scholars that liability rules
for constitutional rights are inappropriate and perhaps unconstitutional
(aside, of course, form the Takings context).
2. Valuation difficulties.
Accurately appraising the plaintiff’s loss is always a problem with
liability rules, which replace a market mechanism for determining price
with a governmental one. The severity of the problem depends on the nature
of the entitlement in question. When an entitlement is not traded in thick
markets or has elements of idiosyncratic value, accurate judicial valuation
becomes more difficult.. The difficulty manifests in both decision costs
(such as legal fees, judicial salaries, and discovery) and error costs (the
incorrect incentives created through inaccurate valuations). The wide use of
property rules in private law is due, in part, to a belief that valuation
difficulties are so ubiquitous and intractable that legal remedies are never
adequate.106
Yet juries do assign values to even the most inchoate injuries, such as
extreme emotional distress and loss of consortium. Such damages are
controversial, and may be systematically wrong; certainly one is more
skeptical of them than damages for economic loss, which helps explain
restrictions on the recovery for non-pecuniary injuries. Juries are often
asked to put a price on constitutional entitlements, as when they award
damages to victims of illegal seizures, police brutality or malicious
governmental discrimination. These awards are made only because it is too
late for anticipatory relief, but it bears noting that the law does not regard
the valuation of these entitlements as being a task beyond the competence
of courts.
To be sure, constitutional entitlements are, on the whole, harder to value
than private law entitlements,107 and the inchoate rights typically at issue in
104

See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost
Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 U. VA. L. REV. 1135 (2005) (showing how liability
rules are used in the prior restraint doctrine, Eighth Amendment Bail Clause, procedural
due process, Fourth Amendment search and seizure rules, and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
105
Id. at 1165-69.
106
See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53
(1993) (arguing that equitable relief is the norm in much broader area of private law than
generally appreciated).
107
See Kontorovich, Two Dimensions, at 1147-48 (discussing valuation difficulties
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standing problems will be particularly troublesome. What is less clear is
whether constitutional entitlements pose any greater valuation problems
than the inchoate entitlements in common law. The correct measure of
damages is how much the plaintiff would demand to be paid to suffer the
injury, and it is hard to see why this is more speculative when the injury is
an establishment of religion rather than intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Concerns about valuation difficulties are often put in terms of whether a
damages award will capture the “full” cost of the harm – that is, the
assumption is often that error will be systematically biased towards undercompensation. (Error is only a social problem if it is systematically biased
one way or another.) Injunctive essentialism is partly based on the view that
money will not make the plaintiff whole. It seems the opposite could also be
true; it is actually a difficult empirical question. One can imagine a rejected
applicant challenging an affirmative action program. Had someone
approached him before he applied, he may have accepted a modest sum to
take his chances under the program; a damage award, made in hindsight
could be much larger.
On the other hand, the role of the jury may raise a particular problem in
hard standing cases, where the great majority of entitlement holders assign a
zero or negative value to exercising the entitlement. Here a judge could not
charge a jury to award damages based on how much they would need to be
paid to suffer the same injury (a common way of getting at non-pecuniary
damages) because most would suffer it gladly.108

3. Free riders.
Valuation problems are not unique to the jointness problem; a more
particular problem with liability rules in this context involves distinguishing
those genuinely aggrieved by the governmental action (those that, unlike the
majority, place a positive value on their entitlement) from possible
pretenders. With the kind of entitlements and injuries that hard standing
cases involve, the only observable difference between these two classes is
that the former comes forth to litigate. Ideology (broadly understood as
beliefs, politics, religions, appraisal of risks, temperament, concern or some
similar subjective disposition) is all that separates the ideological or public
interest plaintiff (or any plaintiff in a situation where many are harmed but
with constitutional rights).
108
See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of A (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (2003) (noting that since judges are themselves
taxpayers, one might think that they would have all have a conflict of interest in presiding
over a taxpayer standing suit).
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few sue) from everyone else. The problem for liability rules is that such
internal states are easy to fake or opportunistically adopt.
Imagine in Richardson a liability rule substituting for the standing
jurisdictional bar. The case would proceeds to the merits, where the
plaintiff wins. Instead of enjoining the CIA to reveal its accounts, the court
would remedy Richardson’s injury by awarding him $1,000. Under the
theory behind the liability rule, all other positive value entitlement holders
should be able to recover as well. Unless the full cost to the positive-value
people is internalized, there is no assurance that the government’s policy
has a net social benefit.109
However, once the first plaintiffs win their case, it becomes difficult to
determine who the positive-value people are. At this point, anyone claiming
that they are aggrieved by the CIA’s nondisclosure could come forth and,
relying on Richardson as a precedent, claim $1,000 for themselves.
Assuming a unified and indivisible course of government conduct – which
this Article treats as the predicate for standing problems – once the first
award is made, every American willing to profess the views of the original
plaintiff, at least in a complaint, can be interchangeably plugged in as a
subsequent plaintiff. The Supreme Court greatly mitigated this problem
when it held the new doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel110
inapplicable to suits against the United States.111 But this merely changes
the problem from one of collateral estoppel to one of stare decisis.112
Nonetheless, winnowing out insincere plaintiffs would be a difficult
task, requiring an individualized inquiry into the subjective beliefs of each
plaintiff. For most there would be no evidence apart from their own
testimony. Even for those where evidence could be had of a contrary prior
disposition, it would be difficult to use this to block relief, for that would
result, quite oddly, in less constitutional protection for people who change
their minds than for those of long-established views.
The key point is that given the nature of the protected entitlement, it
109

The discussion here holds to one side questions about the extent to which the
government internalizes costs. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). It also
assumes the government acts as an agent for society at large rather than pursuing its own
agenda. Clearly if internalization and agency are problematic, it weakens the analysis of the
Article, along with much of the rest of constitutional theory.
110
This is the practice where a subsequent plaintiff uses the victory of a prior plaintiff
against a common defendant to conclusively establish facts or issues common to both
cases. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
111
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
112
If the first suit was resolved by the Supreme Court, the effect on subsequent
litigation would be the same. Otherwise, the free-rider problem would be reduced as freeriding would only be possible within circuits where plaintiffs had won.
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would be very difficult to distinguish sincere plaintiffs from the
opportunistic ones, who would have waived (or even paid to not exercise)
their entitlement under a property rule. If enough negative-value entitlement
holders take advantage of a prior judgment to receive damages, the cost of
compensation could exceed the social benefit of the government action, and
the liability rule cure would be worse than the property rule disease.
C. Making Liability Rules Work
In situations where the standing doctrine is currently used to bar suits
for lack of an “injury-in-fact,” it might be preferable to recognize standing
but to use liability rules rather than property rules. A major problem with
this is separating sincere plaintiffs from opportunistic ones; the first subpart
below considers a possible solution. Correctly valuing the entitlements is
another problem; the second section below considers an important standing
situation where valuation difficulties seem tractable.
1. Liability rule with an event-based statute of limitations.
A better solution would be to switch to liability rules while limiting the
preclusive effect of the first favorable judgment. The best way to do this
would be with a statute of limitations that expires when a favorable
judgment becomes final after appeal in whatever case first reaches that
mark. In other words, to get within the limitations period one would have to
file before any favorable appellate judgment in any of the other suits on the
matter becomes final. (Since all potential plaintiffs are injured by the same
course of government conduct, the clock would start running for everyone
at the same time; in cases where this may not be true, tolling would of
course be appropriate.) The statute of limitations would cut out concern
about stare decisis free-riding because the limitations period would end the
moment that res judicata effect would begin.113 At the same time, this
would allow an indefinite number of genuinely aggrieved plaintiffs to
receive compensation by filing early. Presumably it is the ideological
plaintiffs, those with the greater injury, who will file first, and thus
compensation will roughly track injury. Thus this solution also acts as a
filter between sincere and strategic plaintiffs.
2. Taxpayer remedies for taxpayer standing.
The valuation difficulties caused by liability rules may be easiest to deal
with in taxpayer suits, which have long been a major source of standing
113

In a similar but narrower vein, Prof. Brilmayer has suggested eliminating the stare
decisis and collateral estoppel effect of judgments adverse to the plaintiff of questionable
standing as an alternative to the standing doctrine. See Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. at 309.
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controversies.114 Taxpayer suits are seen as the paradigm of generalized
grievances.115 Taxpayer suits challenge the legality of governmental
spending; the invocation of the plaintiffs’ status as taxpayers ostensibly
distinguishes their interest in the matter from a purely abstract or altruistic
one, from a mere citizen’s interest. Striking down the challenged program
would reduce total expenditures and ultimately bring a reduction in taxes.
Thus the theory behind taxpayer suits seeks to connect something that looks
like pure citizen standing to the most traditional of injuries, economic harm.
The Court has had little truck with this theory. If a program is struck down,
the government would most likely find something else to spend the money
on, rather than refund it – thus the element of “redressability” is missing.
With massive deficit spending, there is even less connection between being
a present-day taxpayer and financing of current government operations.
Moreover, the Court recognizes that taxpayer standing cannot be
understood as anything other than a fiction116 to disguise what is at bottom a
citizen or private attorney general suit. Almost everyone pays taxes, and
thus the plaintiff’s interest is indistinguishable from those of many
others;117 and all government actions involve money either obtained through
taxation, or fungible with it. Thus federal taxpayer status has been
consistently rejected as a basis for standing despite ongoing attempts to
assert it,118 with the important exception of Establishment Clause suits
challenging Congressional spending programs.119
Understanding the problems to which standing responds – problems
caused by overlapping and thus inalienable rights regarding a single course
of conduct – gives a new perspective on the taxpayer suits. The problem
with these suits is not the lack of injury or redressability, but the remedy
sought. Though they base their standing on a purely economic injury, the
taxpayer suits do not seek monetary relief but rather to enjoin the spending
program.120 If their interest in the legality of the program stems from their
status as taxpayers, then the relief they seek is overbroad; nothing about
being a taxpayer should entitle them to question how their funds and those
of others are being spent.
If the program is unitary in the sense that opt-outs cannot be excluded,
114

See Frothigham.
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See Staudt, Taxpayers in Court, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (showing that federal courts bar
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See Flast v. Cohen.
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See Staudt, Taxpayers, at 776 (“The goal of the lawsuit is to halt government
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an injunction raises the problems discussed in Part II. However, the
taxpayer theory, and the objection to spending on the program, shows how
the unitary program can be disaggregated. If the remedy is at law – a refund
of the plaintiff’s pro-rated contribution to the program – then one plaintiff’s
disposition of her entitlement would not affect other potential plaintiffs’
disposition of theirs. While action may be unitary, money is infinitely
divisible.
All of the problems with a liability rule solution seem easier with a
taxpayer suit. Damages are easy to calculate – the cost of the program
multiplied by the plaintiff’s fractional share of the national tax revenue.
Injunctive essentialism seems at its weakest here, where the plaintiff
complains of an essentially economic injury. The liability rule answers the
redressability concern that hangs over taxpayer suits by ensuring that the
plaintiff benefits from winning the suit. (To be sure, for most taxpayers and
most spending programs, the individual’s share would be minute enough
that they would be dwarfed by the costs of litigation, and even by the
administrative costs of distributing the damages.) On the other hand, this
solution shares the weakness of liability rules as a response to jointness -- it
does nothing to address free-rider problems. However, those could be dealt
with through the kind of statute of limitations discussed in the previous
subsection.
D. Disaggregation with Property Rules
The problem to which standing responds can be managed to some extent
even under a property rule system. To alternatives are discussed. The first
focuses simply on narrowing the scope of injunctions; this would represent
the most modest reform discussed in this Article. However, it cannot be
applied to all or perhaps even most types of government action, thus greatly
limiting its utility. Furthermore, it may reduce the magnitude or probability
of jointness problems but not enough to make a difference. Still, if one finds
the costs of robust standing unacceptable, this proposal will be a practical
and almost costless alternative in that it does not seek to limit plaintiff’s
standing at all, but only the scope of injunctive relief. The second
alternative is more innovative, and would probably require legislative
implementation. But it might serve the goals of standing better than either
current doctrine or the alternatives discussed here.
1. Narrowing injunctions.
As has been seen, a key feature of the standing problem is a single
government action that infringes on the entitlements of many people, rather
than many independent actions directed at many people. The indivisibility

27-Mar-07]

EFFICIENCY AND AUTONOMY

47

of the action creates the holdout problem. Its applicability to many people
makes it difficult to have alienability of the entitlements to be free of the
action. However, whether an action or program is truly unitary is not always
clear, and in some way is a function of other aspects of the law, in
particular, the choice of remedial regime.
To the extent law can disaggregate governmental actions into smaller
parcels, along geographic or other lines, the problem that standing seeks to
address diminishes. The inauguration case discussed in Part II.B.2 is a clear
example of a completely unitary action with nationwide scope. But consider
another suit by Newdow, where he challenged the recitation of the pledge of
allegiance in schools on Establishment Clause grounds. The recitation of the
pledge is geographically divisible. It can be recited in some judicial circuits
but not others, in some school districts but not others, even in some class
rooms in a particular school but not in others.
Such disaggregation can be implemented simply by issuing narrow
injunctions. Indeed, the narrower the remedy is on the back end, the less the
need for narrow standing on the front end. If one can only challenge the
recitation of the pledge in one’s own classroom, the problems that standing
responds to greatly diminish. For one, the class of potential plaintiffs in
each classroom would be small, definite (knowable in advance) and difficult
to manipulate. This would make bargaining among the people with different
valuations easier. By contrast, if the question is the Pledge nationally, the
class of potential plaintiffs is vast, difficult to identify, and manipulable.
This is not so different from what courts do when applying the standing
doctrine in Establishment Clause. In cases challenging religious displays or
symbols, standing is often limited to those with some “personal connection”
or geographic nexus to the display, such as those who routinely see it,
“usually in the[ir] home or community.”121 Similarly, a plaintiff challenging
his local religious display should presumably not have standing to challenge
that of a far-off town, even if set up as part of the same program.
The “personal connection” test serves the transaction costs purposes of
standing limitations very poorly, because while it may reduce the number of
people with standing, it still leaves class membership undefined and
completely open.122 A potential plaintiff can easily acquire a “personal
connection” by slightly changing his routine to occasionally pass by the
display. The potential for the class to expand in this way makes settlement
with known members futile, and holdout easy. When looking for axes along
which an action can be divided, the key is to create discrete groups of
121
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The same can be said of the nexus requirements imposed on plaintiffs in statutory
rights cases like Lujan. These requirements have been widely ridiculed as artificial by
critics of standing.
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potential plaintiffs corresponding to each unit. Thus it is important to try to
carve out discrete plaintiff groups whose membership is defined ex ante,
identifiable, and closed.
To be sure, the idea that injunctions should be narrowly cast is an old
maxim of equity. Yet it seems forgotten in cases of broad public concern,
for obvious reason – if the pledge is unconstitutional why not ban it
everywhere? The answer suggested here is because people everywhere are
not complaining, and a remedial zealousness would lead to jointness
problems.
2. Random standing.
Perhaps the best way of realizing the efficiency goals of standing
without the downsides of the current doctrine would be a system of random
standing. Standing to litigate a given injury would be given to – and
confined to – a representative sample of the allegedly injured population.
The system would be triggered by the court concluding that a suit before it
raised a standing problem as defined in Part II – a government program that
infringes on many peoples rights in a similar or identical fashion. If the
disaggregation solution suggested above did not seem feasible, the court
would send notice to representative sample of the affected class. The notice
would inform them of the alleged rights violation, and that they were one of
a certain number of people given standing to pursue equitable remedies
against the violation. The sample group would be chosen using methods
such as those used by polling agencies; it should be just large enough to be
statistically representative. The expenses and administration of the sampling
would be, at least originally, borne by the original plaintiff and her
attorneys – the system is essentially that of class action notification, except
seeking opt-ins, not opt outs.
Anyone in the sample group could, if they wished, sue to redress the
constitutional violation. If even a single one of them chose to do so, they
would have standing per se; the Court would not be able to say their injury
was too abstract or general. However, if none of the random group chose to
challenge the government program, no one else could so.
The random system has many advantages. Unlike current standing
doctrine, it would never result in a system where no one has standing to
challenge a constitutional violation that affects many. At the same time, the
class of potential plaintiffs would be small, closed and identifiable – indeed,
the names of group members should be shared with the defendant to
facilitate bargaining. This would prevent some of the most severe
inefficiencies that could result from a liberal standing regime.
One of the greatest difficulties for standing’s efficiency function is that
it depends on the Court making ad hoc and poorly informed judgment about

27-Mar-07]

EFFICIENCY AND AUTONOMY

49

the relative proportion of positive and negative value rights holders. The
existence of one plaintiff out of 300 million potential ones says very little.
However, one out of a few thousand would suggest the negative value rights
holders are numerous enough that despite their being a minority, they still
might be the highest value users of the right.
Random standing would go a long way to solving the problems of
jointness by creating a manageably small, closed and identifiable class of
rights-holders. It would not entirely solve the problem; the possibility of
holdout would remain. That is, because any one individual among the
sample group can hold hostage the entire social surplus (assuming it exists),
the incentive for such strategic behavior will remain. The probability of
holdout preventing an efficient solution decreases with the number of
potential veto-holders, but with any group large enough to be meaningfully
representative, holdout may be a possibility.
E. Summary.
The discussion of alternative methods of avoiding the welfare losses
caused by jointness help explain why it is in reality addressed by the
ungainly injury-in-fact standing doctrine. Alternative methods of avoiding
the welfare losses caused by jointness appear unattractive, inadequate or
impractical. Liability rules recapitulate many of the problems seen under
property rules. Random standing may get better results, though it only
reduces, rather than eliminates the holdout problem. However, it is
exceedingly unlikely that random standing would ever be implemented by
Congress: making the vindication of constitutional rights explicitly depend
on fortuity cannot be politically attractive. As for the narrow injunctions
approach, it is easy enough to implement in situations where divisions can
be made along geographic lines, but altogether impossible to implement in
other important contexts, like Richardson, or the Inauguration case.
Liability rules with a statute-of-limitations to screen out insincere plaintiffs
may be the best answer, but would almost certainly require some legislative
authorization. But while arguments can be made for the constitutionality of
confining constitutional plaintiffs to legal remedies,123 they go against the
grain – as does an event-based, rather than a time-based statute of
limitations. Not surprisingly, Congress has not arrived at a solution that
would involve a combination of two such unusual and controversial
features.
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V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
This Part will consider some miscellaneous implications of the account
of standing elaborated above.
A. Non-Hoehfeldian plaintiffs.
Denials of standing usually involve non-Hoehfeldian plaintiffs, that is,
plaintiffs whose are not seeking redress for a violation of their personal,
common law rights. Some argue that this is because judges invented the
doctrine to obstruct the exercise of the new “public rights.”124 The role of
standing described in this Article suggests another explanation (though of
course it does not exclude sloppy or politically-motivated judging). First,
the amorphous and abstract nature of non-Hoehfeldian interests makes it
likely that they will be widely held, and that it will be difficult to identify
injured entitlement holders ex ante. Second, the abstract nature of the injury
makes it easy to simulate, and thus prevents the plaintiff group from every
truly being closed, thereby preventing efficient settlement. Jointness
problems arise more frequently with non-Hoehfeldian or public rights, but
they are not limited to them.
Thus one would expect to see fewer standing problems where
constitutional rights track common law rights than where they do not.
Common law entitlements were generally defined in such a way as to avoid
overlapping rights. Thus one can predict that as the law moves away from
using the common law definition of property and towards “expectation of
privacy” to define the scope of protection under Fourth Amendment,
standing problems will become more common. Standing problems will be
most frequent under the structural provisions of the Constitution and the
Establishment Clause because actions that violate them necessarily affect
many people in the same way.125
B. Equal Protection
When the rights of some are violated but the same rights of others
similarly situated are protected, the account of standing presented in Parts II
and III does not apply. A defining feature of jointness is that the
government action affects a broad class of people who have an entitlement
to be free of it. It is not a situation where a majority countenances the
infringement of the rights of a minority, but rather where the rights of all
members of the class are infringed, and the only possible difference among
class members is how much they would pay to be free of the infringement.
124
125

See, e.g., Sunstein; Jaffe.
See Redish, Political Order at 103.
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One protection against abuse is that all must have their rights on the line.
Yet the gist of the equal protection claim is that basis by which the class
of affected people was defined was in itself illegitimate. So it would be odd
to deny standing on injury-in-fact grounds for an Equal Protection claim.126
Equal protection violations involve singling out a particular class for
inferior treatment; and singling out is the antithesis of jointness, for the
singled-out class is presumably limited and defined.127
C. Class actions.
Standing determinations involve some of the same considerations as
class certification.128 Both involve efforts by one party to get an
adjudication of widely-held rights. The points developed above suggest that
liberal standing would result in a dysfunctional version of the class action
without any of its safeguards. Broad standing makes everyone a member of
what can be a nationwide plaintiff “class.” As with class actions, a question
arises as to who can determine what a fair settlement is. In a class action,
the class is represented by unitary counsel; the defendant knows that settling
with the named representative’s counsel will transfer all of the class
members’ entitlements. Because this is a significant power, both named
plaintiff and counsel achieve representative status only after demonstrating
their fitness to the court.
Broad standing is like a class action where, in effect, no one can settle
the class’s claims. Unlike in a formal class action, those with different
preferences cannot opt out. A minority can effectively dictate the remedies
for the entire class, who might prefer something entirely different.129 One
person can bring the entire “class” to litigation while all other members
would benefit from settlement.
In the class action process, the party that determines the disposition of
the class’s entitlements must have interests closely approximating those of
all other class members. With broad standing, there are no such guarantees,
126

But see Allen v. Wright.
One could imagine the opposite problem – what might called “intentional
jointness,” where the government broadens the scope of a constitutionally dubious action to
include a great number of people specifically to create sanding difficulties. It is not clear if
such a thing has even happened. If the government ceases a challenged action to evade
review, courts will entertain a challenge despite its mootness. Presumably they could take
the same approach to intentional jointness.
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See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 216 (noting analogy between standing to assert broadly
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Brilmayer, “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. at 307-09.
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Thus the representation problem in class actions arises not just because the absent
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and the plaintiff may have interests diametrically opposed to the rest of the
group whose rights are affected.130 When the plaintiff is a poor
representative, or there are cleavages within the proposed class, the proper
course is to deny certification and allow the suits to proceed individually, or
to certify subclasses. Yet jointness prevents such disaggregation. The court
must then choose whose valuation of the right will prevail. Such a decision
is unavoidable when conflicting claims are made to a common resource.
Sometimes denying standing means no one can bring a case at all; but this
is little different from denying certification on grounds of heterogeneity to a
purported class whose members individually all have negative value claims.
In short, liberal standing would allow for a kind of class action that
cannot be settled by the plaintiff, cannot be opted-out of by absent class
members, and where the plaintiff may have interests that sharply conflict
with those of the class – a class action with few of the protections of the
Rule 23 regime and less advantages.
D. Statutory rights.
The discussion has thus far focused on entitlements created by the
Constitution. Yet standing issues can arise regardless of the source of the
substantive law. Indeed, much of the criticism of the Court’s standing
jurisprudence has come in response to cases where the government is sued
for purely statutory violations, most commonly in the context of regulatory
action.131 As a positive matter, the analysis of standing’s consequences for
statutory rights is much the same as for constitutional ones. However, it
may have different normative implications for statutory rights.132
Both the inalienability and holdout problems discussed in Part II arise
regardless of the source of the underlying entitlement. Broader standing
increases the likelihood of inefficient outcomes. Even if, as Prof. Sunstein
130

The situation is analogous to smoking or asbestos-exposure class actions that seek
to simultaneously espouse the claims of dead, symptomatic, and asymptomatic individuals.
While all have suffered the same legal injury, the vast difference in the degree and nature
of their harm may make symptomatic plaintiffs poor representatives of asymptomatic ones.
Indeed, they may have opposing interests, with one side favoring a cash judgment that
would ruin the defendant but would provide immediate relief, while others favor the
establishment of a trust that would only pay out a small portion of its assets in the present
period but ensure that the defendant company would be around to pay medical expenses
that arise ten years later.
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See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988) (arguing that applying standing limitations, which are based
on common-law concepts of injury, to administrative action improperly constitutionalizes
common law notions of injury).
132
See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 S. CT. REV. 37, 60 (suggesting that
injury-in-fact requirements may be proper in constitutional cases on constitutional
avoidance grounds).
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points out, regulatory injuries by their nature affect a broader class of
people than common law ones, this does nothing to reduce transaction costs
that arise when a large and amorphous class of people have standing. When
transaction costs are high, so long as a governmental program causes some
prohibited harm, it can be blocked regardless of its net benefits.133
However, this subpart will suggest this is a weaker justification for standing
limitations for statutory rights than constitutional ones.
Constitutional entitlements, in contrast, are cut from a uniform cloth.
Everyone has them in equal amounts.134 It is in the nature of American
individual rights that they protect all individuals;135 structural provisions
organize the government that governs everyone. If one wanted to limit the
exercise of such entitlements in certain unusual circumstances
characterized by high transaction costs, it would be difficult to incorporate
such a limitation into the definition of the right. However, a natural way to
do it would be to build in jurisdictional flexibility and one can imagine the
“cases or controversies” limitation filling this role.
Proponents of the “cause-of-action” theory of standing would argue that
this general availability of constitutional entitlements itself represents a
constitutional determination about standing, namely, that it should be broad.
There are several responses to this point. First, on a doctrinal level, both the
distribution of entitlements and the “case or controversy” limitation spring
from the same document. There is no a priori reason to think that the
distribution of entitlements represents a complete judgment about what
constitutes a “case or controversy.” Instead, “case or controversy” may be a
judgment about the acceptable conditions for the exercise of entitlements
created elsewhere. Unless one believes (or believe the Framers believed)
that the correct level of constitutional violations is strictly zero in all
situations, there is no reason to think that the creation and allocation of
constitutional rights, unmitigated by a standing barrier in jointness
situations, represents the only and last word on when rights can be asserted.
This is not always the case for statutory rights. Unlike constitutional
entitlements, statutory and regulatory entitlements are made-to-order by
Congress. They are often nuanced and detailed. Congress to bestow rights
133

This assumes the illegal feature of the program is integral to it, so that that
enjoining the harm effectively blocks the entire program.
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See COOTER, STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION at 249 (describing the “equality constraint”
on constitutional rights, under which “one person’s liberty cannot change without the same
change in everyone’s liberty”).
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This is truer after the Reconstruction Amendments. Many questions remain about
the availability of constitutional rights to foreigners abroad. Compare J. Andrew Kent, A
Textual Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L. J. __ (2007), with Kal Raustiala,
The Geography of Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2501 (2005); Jules Lobel, The Constitution
Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 871 (1989).
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of action only on particular types of parties, can condition their exercise in a
variety of highly particular ways, and in short, set up highly reticulated
mechanisms for the enforcement and exercise of rights that it creates.
Congress can create an entitlement and vest its enforcement only in the
Executive, or in certain groups, or in everyone.
Thus when Congress broadly extends statutory rights, it suggests a
deliberate choice to allow a potential minority of dissenters to determine the
ultimate use of the right. A citizen-suit provision suggests that Congress
regards the proper level of violation to be zero. This is because when
Congress creates regulatory rights, the enforcement scheme can be matched
with the right with a great degree of specificity.
Part III showed that standing protects the exercise of rights by people
other than the plaintiff. This is because almost all constitutional entitlements
can be waived or traded for something of greater value: they are
presumptively waivable. This need not be the case with statutory rights.
Congress can tailor rights so as to not have a “flip side.” For example, an
entitlement can just be given to people “adversely affected” by the
government action; in which case there is no “negative entitlement” for
others to trade and thus no autonomy problem.
Liberal standing can result in significant social losses in situations of
jointness. Congress can choose to adopt inefficient statutes – there is no
social surplus maximization principle constraining it. But Congress can
make these choices – and unmake them – one statute at a time. It can create
some rights that would be unconstrained by social welfare concerns and
others that are. Because of the uniform nature of constitutional rights, their
silence as to remedies, and the extraordinary difficulty of amending it, one
should be more hesitant to adopt a interpretation of the Constitution that
would periodically result in large social losses. Thus it makes more sense to
think that the Constitution contains a built-in safety-net against such
problems than it does to think statutes are limited by an Art. III injury
requirement. And indeed, the Court seems to take a more liberal view of the
injury requirement in statutory than in constitutional standing.136

CONCLUSION
Standing is a pragmatic response to a real and potentially serious
136

See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 1 TREATISE ON CONST. L. §
2.13(f)(2) (3d ed. 2006); Logan at 48-49. For an example of how standing can be denied
for the same type of injury when brought as a constitutional claim but granted in a suit
pursuant to a statute authorizing action by “any person,” compare Richardson with Akins
vs. FEC.
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problem. It is not an ideal response. Purely legal relief would be preferable
to a jurisdictional dismissal on a variety of grounds, both instrumental and
“equitable.” However, liability rules may not be a realistic option for both
doctrinal and functional reasons. There may be ways around the liability
rule problem, and there are entirely different types of solutions, such as
random standing. But these are not avenues the legal system is likely to
explore. Taking these alternatives off the table, the Court must choose
between the default property rule paradigm and pure condemnation of the
relevant entitlement. A former could lead to massive social losses; losses
created not by the perverse preferences or illegitimate tastes of the majority,
but out of the transaction cost structure of the situation, one in which the
government would need unanimous consent to carry out a particular policy.
In a larger group unanimity is impossible, but 99% is certainly impressive
and may suggest that the majority of rights holders would prefer to buy out
any dissenting plaintiffs, but cannot do so simply because of the transaction
costs. Standing allows the Court to ignore the difference between 99% and
100% in situations where transaction costs prevent the 99% from securing
the consent of the minority. Thus standing becomes a “second-best”
response to the transaction cost problems arising out of jointness.
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